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Abstract 
Large-scale increases in discrimination can lead to dismissals of highly qualified business leaders who 
belong to targeted groups. We study how the forced removal of Jewish managers in Nazi Germany, 
caused by surging antisemitism, affected large _firms. The loss of Jewish managers led to large and 
persistent stock price reductions for affected firms. Dividend payments and returns on assets also 
declined. The effect of losing Jewish managers was distinct from other shocks that hit German firms 
after 1933, for example Nazi policies or firm-specific demand shocks. A back-of-the-envelope 
calculation suggests that the aggregate market valuation of firms listed in Berlin fell by 1.8 percent of 
German GNP because of the expulsion of Jewish managers. The findings imply that discrimination 
can lead to persistent and first-order economic losses. 
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Large-scale increases in discriminatory attitudes can lead to dismissals of highly qualiﬁed busi-
ness leaders who belong to targeted groups. Recent political developments in several countries
have renewed interest in the eﬀects of this form of discrimination. For example, the travel ban on
citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries has raised fears among large U.S. corporations that
increasing discrimination will leave them unable to retain talent.1 In Turkey, several thousand
managers who follow the cleric Fethullah Gülen have been arrested or have ﬂed overseas since
2016, fueling concerns of an economic collapse (New York Times 2017; The Economist 2017b).
History is replete with cases where the rise of a discriminatory ideology forced highly qualiﬁed
individuals to give up important positions in the economy. Examples include the forced internment
of Japanese-Americans during World War II, the eviction of the entrepreneurial Huguenots from
17th century France, the expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972, and the emigration of ethnic
Chinese from Indonesia following discriminatory laws in 1959 and anti-Chinese riots in 1998.2
Such discriminatory dismissals are, of course, extremely hurtful to the targeted individuals. But
there is little evidence on whether such discrimination can cause economic losses for ﬁrms and the
economy as a whole, beyond hurting the welfare of the discriminated individuals. In particular,
it has not been established how easily ﬁrms can replace leaders who leave due to discrimination,
which particular individual characteristics are hard to replace, and how long it can take ﬁrms to
recover.
In this paper, we analyze arguably the most horrendous episode of discrimination in human
history, the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany. Our study examines how the removal of senior
managers of Jewish origin, caused by the rise of antisemitism in Nazi Germany, aﬀected large Ger-
man ﬁrms. After the Nazis gained power on January 30, 1933, discrimination against Jews quickly
became commonplace in Germany. By 1938, individuals with Jewish ancestry had eﬀectively been
excluded from the German economy. Using newly collected data, we show that ﬁrms that had em-
ployed managers of Jewish origin were unable to replace them adequately. Stock prices, dividend
payments, and returns on assets of these ﬁrms declined relative to unaﬀected ﬁrms after 1933 and
did not recover for at least 10 years, the end of our sample period. Stock prices only fell for ﬁrms
that lost highly qualiﬁed managers with speciﬁc characteristics (university degrees and connec-
tions to other ﬁrms). The eﬀect was distinct from other shocks hitting German ﬁrms after 1933,
1Concerned ﬁrms include Amazon (Wingﬁeld and Wakabayashi 2017), Nike (Cox 2017), MasterCard (McGregor
2017), and Ben & Jerry’s (Solheim 2017).
2Japanese-Americans were on average highly educated and some were important managers, in particular in ﬁrms
supplying agricultural products (Chin 2005). They were interned due to “race prejudice” (U.S. CWRIC 1982). The
Huguenots (French Protestants) were among the “wealthiest merchants and most successful industrialists” and their
inﬂuence on the French economy was “disproportionate to their numbers” (Scoville 1953). After 1685, over 200,000
Huguenots left France following religious persecution. Most settled in England, the Dutch Republic, and Prussia (for
example, Hornung 2014). Asians made up less than one percent of the Ugandan population but owned 90 percent of
businesses and paid 90 percent of tax revenue. In 1972, about 50,000 Asians were expelled by military ruler Idi Amin
(BBC 2016). Ethnic Chinese have an “impressive business presence” in Indonesia and have faced repeated waves of
ethnic discrimination since the 18th century (Koning 2007).
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for example policies by the Nazi government, antisemitic measures by the public, or changes in
demand for ﬁrms’ products. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that removing managers
of Jewish origin reduced the aggregate market valuation of ﬁrms listed in Berlin by 1.8 percent of
German gross national product.3 This sizable decrease shows that the rise of a discriminatory ide-
ology can lead to ﬁrst-order and persistent economic losses if it deprives ﬁrms of qualiﬁed business
leaders.
Before the rise of the Nazis, managers of Jewish origin played a key role in the German econ-
omy. In fact, the “economic role of Jews in Germany [...] was greater than that in Western indus-
trialized countries like England, France, or Holland. It also exceeded almost certainly their role
in the development of the American economy” (Mosse 1987, p. 23). Managers of Jewish origin
were assimilated into the German economic elite. Intermarriages and conversions to Christian-
ity were common. Managers of Jewish origin worked in all types of ﬁrms, including in some of
the largest German ﬁrms that were not associated with Judaism in any way (for example, Allianz,
BMW,Daimler-Benz, Siemens&Halske, and I.G. Farben). After theNazis gained power, antisemitism
surged across the whole economy and German ﬁrms began to dismiss managers of Jewish origin.
Deutsche Bank, for example, forced CEO Oscar Wassermann and executive board member Theodor
Frank to resign their positions by June 1, 1933 (James 2001, pp. 25-26). The dismissals targeted a
range of individuals, including managers who had converted to Christianity in the 19th century or
Christians who had just one Jewish ancestor. Firms that happened to employ managers of Jewish
origin lost a signiﬁcant fraction of their senior managers as a result of antisemitic discrimination.
Other ﬁrms did not have any managers of Jewish origin and, therefore, remained unscathed.
To carry out our analysis, we collect the names and characteristics of individuals holding around
30,000 senior management positions in all 655 German ﬁrms listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange.
We also digitize more than 240,000 daily stock prices from a historic publication series by the Berlin
Stock Exchange, and data on dividends and returns on assets from historic volumes ofHandbuch der
deutschen Aktiengesellschaften. We consult various historical sources to identify which managers
were of Jewish origin. While the fraction of Jews among the German population in the early 1930s
was only 0.8 percent, our new data show that 15.8 percent of senior management positions in
listed ﬁrms were held by individuals of Jewish origin in 1932. We ﬁnd that the share of managers
of Jewish origin (which for simplicity we call “Jewish managers”) was roughly constant between
1928 and 1932, plunged dramatically in 1933 (by about a third), and dropped to practically zero in
1938. Jewish managers had exceptional characteristics compared to other managers in 1932. For
example, Jewish managers were on average more experienced, more likely to hold a university
3This number is likely to be a lower bound for the aggregate economic losses to the German economy due to
antisemitic discrimination, since Jews were also removed from lower-level positions, ﬁrms not listed in Berlin, and
important positions in universities, law courts, hospitals, orchestras, theaters, and other institutions. Of course, this
number also does not attempt to do justice to the indescribable human suﬀering and loss of life that the Nazi ideology
brought on Jews and other targeted groups.
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degree, and more connected to other ﬁrms, as measured by seats on the supervisory boards of
other ﬁrms.
We present four main sets of results. We ﬁrst show that losing the Jewishmanagers changed the
observable characteristics of managers at ﬁrms that had employed a higher fraction of Jewish man-
agers in 1932. The number of managers with ﬁrm-speciﬁc tenure, general managerial experience,
university degrees, and the total number of connections to other ﬁrms fell signiﬁcantly, relative to
ﬁrms that had not employed any Jewish managers in 1932. The eﬀects on all management charac-
teristics persisted at least until 1938, the end of our sample period on manager characteristics.
In the second set of results, we show that the loss of Jewish managers aﬀected ﬁrms’ stock
prices. The stock price of the average ﬁrm that had employed Jewish managers in 1932 (where 22
percent of managers had been of Jewish origin) declined by 10.3 log points after the Nazis came to
power, relative to a ﬁrm without Jewish managers in 1932. We also estimate the timing of the stock
price drop. Before the Nazis came to power, stock prices of ﬁrms with a higher fraction of Jewish
managers were not on diﬀerential trends. Starting in 1933, when Jewish managers were forced
out of their ﬁrms, relative stock prices of ﬁrms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers declined
sharply. These losses persisted until the end of the stock price sample period in 1943, 10 years after
the Nazis had gained power. The stock price results are unchanged when we control for several
ﬁrm observables, such as connections to the Nazi Party (Ferguson and Voth 2008), ﬁrm size, age,
and industry. The results are also similar in a sample of ﬁrms that had at least one Jewish manager
in 1932 (using only intensive margin variation in the fraction of Jewish managers to identify the
eﬀect).
We proceed to investigate whether stock prices fell because ﬁrms lost managers with speciﬁc
characteristics. The results indicate that stock prices only declined for ﬁrms that fulﬁlled at least
one of two criteria: ﬁrst, ﬁrms that lost a large share of university-educated managers; and second,
ﬁrms that lost a large share of managerial connections (measured by seats on other ﬁrms’ super-
visory boards). Stock prices did not fall for other ﬁrms that lost Jewish managers. In particular,
there were no eﬀects for ﬁrms that lost small shares of their university-educated and connected
managers or for ﬁrms that only lost experienced managers. This is an important ﬁnding. It im-
plies that not all ﬁrms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 experienced lower stock
prices after 1933. Hence, it is unlikely that other shocks to all ﬁrms with Jewish managers in 1932
explain the declines in stock prices. Rather, the ﬁndings strengthen the view that losses of par-
ticular managerial characteristics (i.e., losses of educated and connected managers) lowered ﬁrm
performance.
We explore further whether the declines in stock prices after 1933 were caused by the removal
of Jewish managers or by other shocks that were correlated with the fraction of Jewish managers
in 1932. We ﬁrst consider shocks that resulted from the general increase in antisemitism after
1933. One possibility is that the Nazi government used repressive measures against ﬁrms that had
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employed Jewish managers in 1932. To explore this possibility, we restrict the sample to only ﬁrms
favored by the Nazi government, such as ﬁrms that supported the Nazis before 1933 or ﬁrms that
received forced labor from the Nazi government. The restriction reduces the sample size from 655
to 171 ﬁrms, but the estimated eﬀect of losing Jewish managers remains of similar magnitude and
statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that repression by the Nazi government does not explain the
eﬀect of losing Jewish managers.
To further investigate the eﬀect of shocks resulting from antisemitism, we identify ﬁrms that
the public and the Nazis perceived to be “Jewish,” using a range of historical sources.4 It was
well-known in Nazi Germany that these ﬁrms were connected to Judaism, so antisemitic measures
by the government and the public were focused on these ﬁrms. Importantly, we show that the
eﬀect of losing Jewish managers remains unchanged when we control for changes in stock prices
of Jewish ﬁrms. Furthermore, comparing the evolution of stock prices of Jewish ﬁrms to ﬁrms
that lost Jewish managers is revealing. Stock prices of Jewish ﬁrms fell in 1935 and recovered
fully by 1943, once all formerly Jewish ﬁrms had been taken over by non-Jews. This is consistent
with the historical literature, which argues that large ﬁrms associated with Judaism suﬀered from
government repression after 1935 (Barkai 1990, p. 83; Strauss 1999, p. XVII; James 2001, p. 38).
In contrast, stock prices of ﬁrms with Jewish managers declined most strongly in 1933 and 1934,
when ﬁrms started to remove Jewish managers, and remained persistently low until 1943. The
contrasting evolution of stock prices suggests that the eﬀect of losing Jewish managers was not
driven by forces that hit Jewish ﬁrms (for example, government repression or losses of customers),
but by forces speciﬁcally associated with the loss of Jewish managers.
We analyze other shocks to ﬁrms caused by antisemitic discrimination. We ﬁnd that a decrease
in the number of lower-ranked Jewish employees is unlikely to drive the results, because the eﬀects
of losing Jewish managers are stable in regions and sectors that employed very few lower-ranked
Jewish employees in 1933. The eﬀects are also stable when we exclude ﬁrms with large Jewish
investors or ﬁrms aﬀected by antisemitic retail boycotts.
The second type of correlated shocks we consider stems from changes in demand for ﬁrms’
products that were unrelated to antisemitic discrimination. The Nazi government started heavy
rearmament and infrastructure programs after 1933. In several tests, we exclude from the sample
ﬁrms that appear on historical lists of suppliers to the Reichswehr or ﬁrms in sectors associated
with rearmament and construction. In all these diﬀerent samples, the eﬀects are similar to the
baseline estimates. This suggests that diﬀerences in exposure to Nazi rearmament or construction
programs do not drive the results. We also identify ﬁrms that had international activities and
ﬁrms that were hit by ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand shocks, using narrative evidence from historical ﬁrm
records. International customers may have reduced demand for the products of some ﬁrms in
4This group of “Jewish ﬁrms” is distinct from ﬁrms with Jewish managers in 1932, since many German ﬁrms
happened to employ managers of Jewish origin without being perceived as “Jewish”, for example BMW, Deutsche
Reichsbahn, or I.G. Farben.
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response to the rise of the Nazis or the removal of Jewish managers. Similarly, ﬁrms with Jewish
managers may have been disproportionately hit by ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand shocks after 1933. When
we exclude either ﬁrmswith international activities or ﬁrmswith ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand shocks from
the sample, the ﬁndings remain essentially unchanged. Taken together, all these tests conﬁrm that
shocks due to rising antisemitism or shocks to demand cannot explain the stock price declines for
ﬁrms that lost Jewish managers.
In the third set of results, we estimate the aggregate cost of losing Jewish managers for ﬁrms
listed in Berlin. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that losing Jewish managers reduced the
market capitalization of the average listed ﬁrm by 5.2 percent after 1933. This implies a decrease in
the aggregate market valuation of 1.8 percent of German GNP. This shows that discrimination can
cause serious economic losses when it leads to the exclusion of qualiﬁed individuals from leading
positions. The calculation assumes that removing the Jewish managers from aﬀected ﬁrms had
negligible spillover eﬀects on ﬁrms that had not employed any Jewish managers in 1932. We test
for such spillovers within regions and industries, and ﬁnd statistically insigniﬁcant and negative
spillover eﬀects. This suggests that the calculation might, if anything, underestimate the aggregate
loss for listed ﬁrms.
In the fourth set of results, we analyze the eﬀects of losing Jewish managers on two additional
measures of ﬁrm performance, dividend payments and returns on assets. We ﬁnd that after 1933,
dividend payments fell by approximately 7.5 percent for the average ﬁrm with Jewish managers in
1932 (which lost 22 percent of its managers). This magnitude is similar to the fall in stock prices,
which suggests that investors priced the stocks proportional to the dividends. We also ﬁnd that
after 1933, the average ﬁrm that had employed Jewish managers in 1932 experienced a decline in its
return on assets by 4.1 percentage points. These results indicate that the loss of Jewish managers
not only reduced market valuations, but also led to real losses in ﬁrm eﬃciency and proﬁtability.
This paper contributes to the literature by studying discrimination “at the top,” i.e., discrimina-
tory removals of highly qualiﬁed leaders. The objective of our study thus diﬀers from the existing
discrimination literature, which has largely focused on discrimination against women, blacks, and
underprivileged groups.5
We also contribute by showing that discrimination causes economic losses beyond hurting
discriminated individuals. Becker (1957) predicted theoretically that discrimination can hurt ﬁrm
proﬁtability. In the existing literature on discrimination against women and blacks, a few papers
use cross-sectional comparisons to analyze eﬀects of discrimination on ﬁrms. English soccer clubs
with more black players achieve higher league positions, conditional on the wage bill (Szymanski
2000). Firms with a higher proportion of female employees earn higher proﬁts and survive for
longer (Hellerstein et al. 2002; Kawaguchi 2007;Weber and Zulehner 2014). In contrast to the cross-
5The literature has largely analyzed whether discrimination against women and blacks aﬀects individual hiring
probabilities and wages (see Altonji and Blank 1999; Bertrand 2011; List and Rasul (2011); Bertrand and Duﬂo 2017 for
extensive surveys).
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sectional approach, we propose a quasi-experimental approach to estimating ﬁrm-level eﬀects: We
identify an economy-wide increase in discrimination and then use ﬁrm-level variation in exposure
to this shock to estimate how rising discrimination aﬀects ﬁrms.
An additional innovation of our approach is that we use stock prices to measure the cost of
discrimination for ﬁrms. Stock prices are a particularly attractive measure because they repre-
sent the present discounted value of future cash ﬂows from holding stocks. Hence, changes in
stock prices fully incorporate how market participants value the long-run costs of discrimination.
Furthermore, by aggregating the ﬁrm-level estimates we can approximate the aggregate cost of
discrimination for all listed ﬁrms. The current literature contains little empirical evidence for how
changes in discriminatory attitudes aﬀect aggregate outcomes.6 A large literature has used wages
to measure discrimination. Fewer papers use other market prices. For example, a pioneering paper
by List (2004) uses trading prices of sportscards to analyze whether individuals from minorities
face discrimination.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the management of large ﬁrms. Inﬂuential stud-
ies by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and Bloom et al. (2017) argue that good management prac-
tices are akin to a more eﬃcient production technology. Gosnell et al. (forthcoming) and Bianchi
and Giorcelli (2019) show which speciﬁc management practices raise worker productivity at large
ﬁrms.7 These studies suggest that ﬁrms can adopt and learn better management practices. The
results of our paper highlight a complementary channel: Management quality also depends on the
exceptional human capital of individual managers who are hard to replace, not only on adoptable
practices. Consistent with the ﬁndings of our paper, Kaplan et al. (2012) and Bandiera et al. (2017,
forthcoming) document a relationship between ﬁrm performance and individual managers’ ability
and behavior, respectively.8 We contribute to the literature by using a quasi-experimental research
design. This allows us to show that losing educated and connected managers aﬀects ﬁrm perfor-
mance, while losing experiencedmanagers does not. Furthermore, our approach enables us to trace
ﬁrm performance over many years. We show that the eﬀects of losing managers can be large and
can persist for at least 10 years after the initial shock. In contrast, most papers analyzing manager
deaths have focused on short-run eﬀects. Studies of manager deaths ﬁnd either small positive or
small negative short-run stock returns, depending on the characteristics of the managers (John-
6Hsieh et al. (forthcoming) use a structural Roy model to argue that declining discrimination against women and
blacks raised U.S. aggregate productivity.
7Several papers study the eﬀect of bundles of general management practices on ﬁrms. Giorcelli (2019) focuses not
on large listed ﬁrms, but on small and medium-sized Italian ﬁrms after World War II. She ﬁnds that training managers
raised ﬁrm performance. Focusing on developing and emerging economies, some studies ﬁnd that encouraging ﬁrms
to adopt bundles of general management practices can raise ﬁrm performance (Bruhn et al. 2010, 2018; Bruhn and Zia
2013; Bloom et al. 2013a, forthcoming; Drexler et al. 2014; Giorcelli 2019). Other studies report limited eﬀects (Cole et
al. 2011; Karlan and Valdivia 2011; Karlan et al. 2015). This suggests the eﬀects may vary by which speciﬁc practices
are adopted and by ﬁrm type, ﬁrm size, and the available human capital in the ﬁrm.
8More generally, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) ﬁnd evidence that there are diﬀerences in “style” across managers,
while Malmendier and Tate (2005) focus on the eﬀects of overconﬁdent managers on corporate investment decisions.
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son et al. 1985; Worrell et al. 1986; Hayes and Schaefer 1999; Borokhovich et al. 2006; Salas 2010;
Nguyen and Nielsen 2010; Fee et al. 2013; Jenter et al. 2017).9
Finally, we show that the loss of the Jewish elite aﬀected the German economy. Our speciﬁc
contribution is to highlight the cost for ﬁrms. Related, the dismissal of Jewish scientists and teach-
ers harmed science (Waldinger 2010, 2012, 2016) and education (Akbulut-Yuksel and Yuksel 2015).
In Russia, the severity of the Holocaust was associated with long-run political and economic out-
comes of cities and regions (Acemoglu et al. 2011; Grosfeld et al. 2013).
1 Historical Context
1.1 Jews in the German Economy
Following the partial emancipation of Jews in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, and in particu-
lar following the full emancipation during German uniﬁcation in 1871, Jews became increasingly
inﬂuential in the German economy. They founded many important ﬁrms and became leading man-
agers in some of the largest German corporations. In 1908, 22 percent of the richest 747 Prussians
with fortunes exceeding 5 million Mark were of Jewish origin (Mosse 1987, p. 6). In 1928, Jews paid
more than 30 percent of Berlin’s city taxes, despite being only 5 percent of the population (Elon
2003, p. 259). Notwithstanding occasional episodes of antisemitism, German Jews were almost en-
tirely assimilated, especially among the economic elite. Inter-religious marriages were common in
the decades before 1933.10 Historians have argued that one could hardly diﬀerentiate a Jewish eco-
nomic elite from a non-Jewish elite during the years of the Weimar Republic (for example Münzel
2006, p. 89).
1.2 The Rise of the Nazi Party
The antisemitic National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP), commonly referred to as the
Nazi Party, received only 2.6 percent of votes in the May 1928 election to the German Reichstag.
In the wake of the Great Depression, the party’s vote share rose to 37.3 percent in the July 1932
election. In the following election in November 1932, the Nazi’s vote share declined to 33.1 percent,
and many political observers predicted a gradual decline of the Nazi movement (see for example
Enderis 1933, a New York Times article published on January 1, 1933). Despite the declining vote
9Unlike many older managers who die, the Jewish managers in our setting were often at the peak of their ability.
Also related, Bennedsen et al. (2016) analyze temporary manager absences due to hospitalizations, ﬁnding transient
eﬀects on ﬁrms. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) report that stock returns declined when the Norwegian gender quota for
corporate boards was ﬁrst discussed. In contrast, Nygaard (2011) ﬁnds a positive eﬀect on returns and Eckbo et al.
(2016) ﬁnd no eﬀect when the quota became mandatory. For small and young startups in Norway, Becker and Hvide
(2017) report that the death of the founding entrepreneur reduced growth of the startup.
10Intermarriage between Jews and Christians increased from 8.4 percent in 1901 to 29.9 percent in 1915. Baptisms of
Jewish men jumped from 8.4 percent in 1901 to 21 percent in 1918 (Elon 2003, p. 229). These numbers were presumably
higher during the Weimar Republic and in particular among the economic elite.
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share of his party, a political vacuum allowed Hitler to become chancellor on January 30, 1933. In
the following months and years, the Nazi government started a host of measures targeting Jews
that ultimately culminated in the Holocaust.
1.3 “Aryanizations” of Stock-Market Listed Firms
The Nazi government did not pass any laws that explicitly forced private ﬁrms to dismiss Jewish
employees before 1938. Nonetheless, many Jewish managers lost their positions as early as 1933,
because of the rise of antisemitism.11 As the dismissals were not guided by formal rules, the “forced
resignation of Jews from the boards of [...] enterprises [...] was a gradual process eﬀected with
widely diﬀering degrees of dignity and consideration” (Mosse 1987, p. 376). Many listed ﬁrms
exploited laws and events that did not directly aﬀect them to remove Jewishmanagers. For example,
the law specifying the dismissal of Jewish civil servants of April 7, 1933 applied only to managers
in ﬁrms that were majority-owned by the state (Münzel 2006, pp. 126-128). Some privately owned
ﬁrms nevertheless used the law as a pretext to dismiss Jewish managers.
In the following years, more and more Jewish managers were forced out of their ﬁrms. By
1938, virtually all Jewish managers had left their ﬁrms, sometimes because non-Jews saw the po-
litical situation as an opportunity to further their own careers by pushing Jews out or because
Jewish managers migrated abroad to escape rising discrimination.12 Following the ordinance on
the “Elimination of Jews from the German Economy” from November 12, 1938, all joint stock ﬁrms
were forced to dismiss remaining Jewish board members to avoid being liquidated (Benz 1988, pp.
324).
The timing of the actual removal of the Jewish managers may have been endogenous to ﬁrm
performance, as ﬁrms tend to dismiss managers when ﬁrms are performing poorly (Murphy and
Zimmerman 1993; Denis and Denis 1995; Hayes and Schaefer 1999; Fee et al. 2013; Jenter and
Lewellen 2017). We therefore use variation in the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 as the treat-
ment variable in our analysis.
Our newly collected data on managers in all German ﬁrms that were listed in Berlin show how
the loss of Jewish managers aﬀected ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that Jews were over-represented among senior
managers relative to their population share of 0.8 percent. Jews held between 15 percent and 16
11The racist neologism “Aryanization” was coined during the 1930s. In the historical literature the term “Aryaniza-
tion” is used as a synonym for the exclusion of Jews from the German economy (see Bajohr 2002, p. 11, for a discussion
of the term). In particular, the term is used for three diﬀerent types of discriminatory measures against Jews: ﬁrst, the
removal of Jews from senior management positions in large German ﬁrms (Münzel 2006); second, the forced sale or
liquidation of smaller Jewish ﬁrms (Bajohr 2002, Kreutzmüller 2017); and third, discrimination against Jewish ﬁrms by
customers, suppliers, and/or the government. In this paper we focus on the ﬁrst type of “Aryanization.”
12Of the approximately 522,000 German Jews, around 304,000 managed to emigrate before the beginning of World
War II (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 2017). The main destinations of Jewish managers were the United
States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and France (Münzel 2006, p. 246). Most of the rest were
brutally murdered in concentration camps. Victims included the former Commerzbank executives Albert Katzenel-
lenbogen and Ludwig Berliner and the former Leonhard Tietz AG executive Franz Baumann. Very few survived the
Holocaust in Germany.
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percent of senior management positions in 1928 and 1932 (Figure 1). By the end of 1933, the fraction
of Jewish managers had fallen by about one third. By 1938, virtually no Jewish managers remained
in ﬁrms that were listed in Berlin.
1.4 The Berlin Stock Exchange
The Berlin Stock Exchange was by far the largest stock exchange in 1930s Germany and one of the
largest in the world, at the level of the stock exchanges in London or Paris. It generated about 66
percent of ﬁnancial transaction tax revenue in Germany. Most major German ﬁrms were listed in
Berlin. The next-largest German stock exchanges generated 12 percent (Frankfurt) and 9 percent
(Hamburg) of transaction tax revenue (Gömmel and Pohl 1992, p. 179). The evidence in Ferguson
and Voth (2008) and our results on the stock prices of “Jewish ﬁrms” in Section 4.1 below show
that stock prices adjusted quickly and in predictable ways to the release of new information. This
suggests that we can use stock prices from 1930s Berlin to meaningfully measure the impact of
removing the Jewish managers.
2 Data
2.1 Data on Senior Managers of Listed Firms
Data on Managers
One contribution of this paper is to construct a comprehensive new database that contains the
names and characteristics of all senior managers of German ﬁrms listed on the Berlin Stock Ex-
change in 1932. We collect the data using a range of historical sources. The 1932 edition of the
Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften contains information on all senior managers (execu-
tive and supervisory board members) of German joint stock ﬁrms. We extract information for all
ﬁrms that were listed in Berlin in 1932.13 The 655 ﬁrms in our sample employed 4,873 senior man-
agers, holding a total of 7,791 positions in 1932 (Table 1).14 We collect similar data for the years 1928,
1933, and 1938 from the respective volumes of the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, as
detailed in Data Appendix B.1.
13In 1932, a total of 784 stocks were listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange. The Handbuch der deutschen Aktienge-
sellschaften reports only information on German ﬁrms, so we exclude 25 stocks of foreign ﬁrms. We also exclude eight
stocks for which the Handbuch does not report board members and two stocks that were never traded in our sample
period. A total of 41 ﬁrms issued multiple stocks (for example Hermes Kreditversicherungsbank A.G. issued two stocks),
so we choose the most frequently traded stock for these ﬁrms. Of the remaining 708 ﬁrms, we exclude 16 stocks of
ﬁrms in liquidation and 37 stocks of ﬁrms that merged with other ﬁrms during our sample period.
14Some managers held multiple positions because they could hold both executive and supervisory board positions
in the same ﬁrm, or executive positions and/or supervisory positions in multiple ﬁrms.
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Identifying Jewish Managers
The Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften does not report information on the Jewish origin
of managers. We therefore consult multiple additional sources to identify Jewishmanagers. Münzel
(2006) lists Jewishmanagers in the 300 largest joint stock ﬁrms andWindolf (2011) compiles a list of
Jewish managers in German ﬁrms. The Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration
nach 1933 contains short biographies of Jewish business people who emigrated fromNazi Germany.
Köhler (2008) studies private bankers of Jewish origin. For managers who did not appear in these
sources, we conduct a manual search in the online databaseWorld Biographical Information System
(WBIS). The database combines information from various collections of biographies, for example
Deutsches Biographisches Archiv (DBA) and Jüdisches Biographisches Archiv (JBA), which allow us
to infer whether a manager was of Jewish origin. Finally, we hand-check all managers who did
not appear in the previous sources by conducting an internet search to ﬁnd information on their
religion. Further details on the data collection are in Data Appendix B.1.
We classify managers as Jewish based on who was considered Jewish in Nazi Germany. This
classiﬁcation includes practicing Jews, such as banker Max Warburg who was active in the Jewish
community of Hamburg. It also includes individuals with Jewish ancestors who had converted to
Christianity, in many cases already during the 19th century; this deﬁnition includes, for example,
I.G. Farbenmanager Carl vonWeinberg.15 All thesemanagers were forced out of their ﬁrms because
of their Jewish ancestry.
Our data show that 423 of 4,873 managers (around 9 percent) were individuals of Jewish origin
(Table 1) in 1932. They held 1,230 out of 7,791 manager positions (around 16 percent).16 Using our
data, we show that already in 1933 one third of the Jewish managers were dismissed from their
positions and by 1938 virtually all Jewish managers had been dismissed (Figure 1).
Characteristics of Managers
We extract information on the characteristics of managers for the years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938
from the respective volumes of theHandbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, as detailed in Data
Appendix B.1.2. Overall, we collect data on 29,834 manager positions for these four years. Table 1
summarizes the manager characteristics for 1932, the year before the Nazis came to power. While
about 1 percent of the relevant age cohorts were studying at a university at the turn of the century
(Windolf 1990), 36 percent of managers held a university degree. This ﬁgure was even higher for
Jewish managers, 45 percent of whom held a university degree. Similarly, Jewish managers were
more likely to hold the honorary title of Kommerzienrat (8.8 versus 4.3 percent). This title was
granted by the German Emperor to individuals who made outstanding contributions to society. It
15This approach follows the deﬁnition of the historical literature on Jews in the Germany economy (see for example
the discussions in Mosse 1987 and Münzel 2006, pp. 80-92).
16This fraction is identical to the one reported by Windolf (2011) in his historical study about the German-Jewish
economic elite.
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is roughly comparable to the honors system of the United Kingdom today.17 The greater prevalence
of academic and honorary recognition among the Jewish managers suggests that they had higher
general human capital than other managers.
Jewish managers had longer tenure in their ﬁrms, measured by whether they had already held
a manager position in the same ﬁrm in 1928 (70.9 versus 61.8 percent). Similarly, they had more
general managerial experience, as measured by whether they had already held a manager position
in any of the sample ﬁrms in 1928 (83.0 versus 68.3 percent). Finally, Jewish managers were also
better connected to other ﬁrms, as demonstrated by the greater number of supervisory board po-
sitions (2.9 versus 1.1) in other ﬁrms. The diﬀerences between Jewish and non-Jewish managers
were not driven by the types of ﬁrms that they worked for. Compared to their non-Jewish col-
leagues in the same ﬁrms, Jewish managers held more academic and honorary titles, had longer
tenure, greater experience, and more connections to other ﬁrms (see Table 1, column 4). Overall,
the statistics suggests that Jewish managers were exceptional along a number of dimensions.18
2.2 Data on Stock Prices
Wemanually digitize stock prices fromhistorical listings (calledBörse undWirtschaft, laterMonatskurs-
blatt Berliner Börse) of the Berlin Stock Exchange (see Data Appendix B.2.1 for details). We record
more than 240,000 daily stock prices for the universe of German ﬁrms listed in Berlin, for the
months January and July of the years 1929 to 1943.19
Some stocks, especially those of smaller ﬁrms, were not traded every day. We therefore average
stock prices in a plus and minus 10-day window around January 10th and July 10th of each year.20
Between 1929 and 1943, the stocks of some ﬁrms were consolidated. For example, Dresdner Bank
stocks were consolidated on August 4, 1932, at an old-stock:new-stock ratio of 10:3. As a result,
the reported stock price increased by 333 percent. We account for these consolidations by dividing
all stock prices by the consolidation ratio (3.333 in our example) after each consolidation. Between
17Businessmen could apply for the title of Kommerzienrat. A rigorous selection process based on wealth, income,
public service, charitable activities, and standing among peers ensured that only the most successful businessmen
were awarded the coveted title (for more information see Mosse, 1987, pp. 3). In 1919, the German Reich oﬃcially
discontinued the awards but most individuals who had been awarded the title continued to list it in oﬃcial documents.
18There are two factors that could explain the exceptional characteristics of Jewish managers. First, discrimination
against Jews may have been prevalent even before 1933 and thus Jews would have had to be exceptional to be hired as
managers. Second, a large literature has highlighted the exceptional human capital of German Jews and, in particular,
the entrepreneurial culture that ﬂourished in the German Jewish community (for example, Botticini and Eckstein 2007,
2012). In the 15th and 16th centuries, Jews were barred from entering many professions and therefore concentrated
their economic activity on trade and banking (Elon 2003, pp. 21). In the 18th and the early 19th centuries, many Jewish
manufacturing ﬁrms were founded by individuals who had traded such goods in the past (Mosse 1987, pp. 55-56). The
entrepreneurial spirit exhibited by many Jews contributed to the lasting success of Jews in manager-run businesses
(Ziegler 2000).
19The German banking crisis led to the closure of the Berlin Stock Exchange between September 1931 and April 12,
1932. For 1932, we therefore use stock prices for April and October. The results are robust to dropping all observations
for 1932 (Appendix Table A.8, columns 1-2).
20The results are robust to averaging stock prices in a plus-minus three-day or plus-minus ﬁve-day window around
January 10th and July 10th or to averaging stock prices for all days of January and July (see Appendix Table A.8).
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1929 and 1943, some ﬁrms issued new stocks and oﬀered existing shareholders a subscription right
to prevent stock dilution. We also adjust stock prices for mechanical drops after the deduction
of subscription rights by multiplying subsequent stock prices by the corresponding adjustment
factor.21
2.3 Data on Dividend Payments
Wemanually digitize the dividend payments of the sample ﬁrms from the listings of the Berlin Stock
Exchange and from the 1935 and 1941 editions of the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften
(see Appendix B.2.2 for details).
2.4 Data on Returns on Assets
We also digitize data on ﬁrms’ returns on assets from the 1932 and 1941 editions of theHandbuch der
deutschen Aktiengesellschaften. The return on assets is the ratio of proﬁts before interest payments
and taxes to total assets. The data are for the years 1931, 1936, and 1940. Many ﬁrms do not report
all income statement and balance sheet items that are required for the calculation of the return on
assets. As a result, the data allow us to calculate the return on assets for 289 ﬁrms (see Appendix
B.2.4 for details).
2.5 Data on Control Variables
Finally, we collect data on various ﬁrm-level control variables measured in 1932. We obtain con-
nections of managers to the Nazi Party from Ferguson and Voth (2008). The measure indicates
whether any of the ﬁrms’ managers made ﬁnancial contributions or provided political support to
Hitler, Göring, or the Nazi Party. We also collect data on nominal capital, industry classiﬁcations,22
and ﬁrm age from the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (1932). Finally, we collect data
on the period during which the balance sheet is reported from Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse.
2.6 Summary Statistics on Firms
Table 2 summarizes the ﬁrm data for the year 1932. The average ﬁrm employed roughly 12 senior
managers in 1932, of which 14 percent were of Jewish origin (column 1). The average ﬁrm with
at least one Jewish manager employed about three Jewish managers in 1932, corresponding to a
fraction of Jewish managers of 22 percent (column 3).
We present statistics for all ﬁrms (column 1), ﬁrms without Jewish managers (column 2), and
ﬁrms with at least one Jewish manager (columns 3-7). This allows us to assess to what extent
21See Appendix B.2.1 for details. The adjustment of stock prices for stock consolidations and subscription rights
is standard practice in the construction of long-run stock indices (see, for example, Ronge 2002, p. 58). The results
without these adjustments are almost identical to the results reported in the paper.
22The industry classiﬁcations are: ﬁnancial services, insurance, transport, mining/iron/steel, machinery/electronics,
construction/stones/earth, textile/clothing, chemistry/paper/wood, food/drinks, and other (consisting mainly of re-
tail/trade/energy provision).
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ﬁrms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers were diﬀerent from other ﬁrms. We ﬁrst compare
ﬁrms without Jewish managers (column 2) to ﬁrms with at least one Jewish manager (column
3). Both types of ﬁrms were on average of similar age and reported their ﬁnancial statements at
similar times. But the two sets of ﬁrms diﬀered on other characteristics. Since Jewish managers
were exceptionally qualiﬁed, the average ﬁrm with Jewish managers had more qualiﬁed managers,
as measured by managers with tenure in the ﬁrm, general experience, university degrees, and
connections. Perhaps surprisingly, the average ﬁrm with Jewish managers was more connected to
the Nazi Party. This can be explained by the fact that ﬁrms with highly qualiﬁed managers were
more connected to politicians. Furthermore, the average ﬁrmwith at least one Jewish manager was
larger, both measured by the number of senior managers and by the nominal capital of the ﬁrm.
There are two reasons for this. First, the probability of employing a Jewish manager increases
mechanically with the number of managers and second, the exceptional characteristics of Jewish
managers allowed them to manage larger ﬁrms.23
Throughout our analysis below, we account for diﬀerences between ﬁrms with and without
Jewish managers using several approaches. First, all regressions include a full set of ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects that control for permanent diﬀerences across ﬁrms. Hence, our identiﬁcation strategy does
not require that ﬁrms were similar in 1932. It only requires that ﬁrms with a higher fraction of
Jewish managers would have evolved in parallel to other ﬁrms had the Jewish managers not been
dismissed. We present evidence in support of this assumption below. For example, we show that
the stock prices of ﬁrms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers were following parallel trends
to ﬁrms without Jewish managers before 1933.
To further strengthen our identiﬁcation strategy, we control for potential shocks to ﬁrms with
diﬀerent characteristics by using a wide range of control variables interacted with full sets of time
ﬁxed eﬀects. For instance, controls for connections to the Nazi Party or various controls for ﬁrm
size (nominal capital and the total number of managers) do not signiﬁcantly change our estimates
(Appendix Table A.7, columns 1-3). We also construct subsamples where ﬁrm characteristics are
similar. We consistently ﬁnd that the eﬀects of interest do not vary in these subsamples. For
instance, we show that the eﬀects are similar in samples with only small and only large ﬁrms
(Appendix Table A.7, columns 5-6).
In robustness checks, we estimate results in samples of ﬁrms that all had at least one Jewish
manager. Conditional on having at least one Jewish manager, ﬁrms with a higher fraction of Jewish
managers were similar to ﬁrms with a lower fraction of Jewish managers (Table 2, columns 4-5).
The ﬁrms look particularly similar along all observable characteristics if we exclude conglomerate
ﬁrms from our sample (columns 6-7). Conglomerates had extremely high nominal capital. The two
23The large diﬀerence in average nominal capital is predominately driven by two conglomerate ﬁrms: the national
railroads Reichsbahn and the chemical producer I.G. Farben. Conglomerates were large ﬁrms composed of formerly
independent companies that operated under one management in 1932. Without these two ﬁrms, the average nominal
capital of ﬁrms with at least one Jewish manager was 16.31 million Reichsmark (RM).
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conglomerates in our sample were the national railroads Reichsbahn and the chemical producer
I.G. Farben. Both had a positive but low fraction of Jewish managers.
3 The Eﬀect of Losing Jewish Managers on the Characteris-
tics of Firms’ Senior Management
This section presents the ﬁrst set of main results. We analyze how the removal of Jewish man-
agers aﬀected the overall characteristics of ﬁrms’ senior management. For this analysis, we use
data on manager characteristics for the years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938. This approach allows us
to investigate eﬀects on characteristics until 1938, when virtually no Jewish managers remained in
their ﬁrms.
Our empirical strategy compares changes inmanager characteristics in ﬁrms that had employed
Jewish managers in 1932, and lost them after the Nazi government took power in January 1933, to
changes in ﬁrms that had not employed Jewish managers. We estimate the eﬀects by running the
following speciﬁcation:
loд(Characteristicit ) =
1938∑
τ=1928
βτ Fraction Jewish Manaдers (1932)i × 1 [t (i) = τ ] (1)
+ FirmFEi + YearFEt + ϵit .
The outcome variable is the log of a certain manager characteristic in ﬁrm i in year t , for example
the log of the number of managers with a university degree in ﬁrm i in year t .24
Fraction Jewish Manaдers (1932)i measures the fraction of Jewish managers in ﬁrm i in 1932.
It is interacted with indicator variables for 1928, 1933, and 1938. The interaction with the indicator
for 1932 is excluded from the regression so that the coeﬃcients are estimated relative to 1932, the
last year before the Nazis came to power. FirmFEi is a full set of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and YearFEt is
a full set of year eﬀects (for 1928, 1933, and 1938). To account for potential correlation of standard
errors within ﬁrms, we cluster standard errors at the ﬁrm level.
We plot the yearly coeﬃcients and the corresponding 95 percent conﬁdence intervals in Figure
2. The ﬁrst outcome variable is a measure for ﬁrm tenure, i.e., the number of managers who had
been working as managers in the same ﬁrm since 1928. From 1932 to 1933, ﬁrms with a higher
fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 experienced a sharp decline in the number of managers with
tenure since 1928, relative to ﬁrmswithout Jewishmanagers (Figure 2, panel a). The drop continued
until 1938 when virtually all Jewish managers had been dismissed (see Figure 1). For both 1933
24A small number of ﬁrms report zeros on some of the outcome variables, sowe cannot include them in speciﬁcations
using the log outcome variable. Appendix Table A.1 reports robustness checks using the inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation, which is an approximation to the log transformation that permits using zero values. The results are
almost identical.
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and 1938, the diﬀerence between ﬁrms that lost Jewish managers and other ﬁrms is statistically
signiﬁcant, relative to their 1932 values. This ﬁnding is not surprising, because once amanagerwith
tenure is expelled, ﬁnding a replacement with the same length of tenure in the ﬁrm is impossible.
The second outcome variable is a measure for experience, i.e., the number of managers who
held a manager position in any of the sample ﬁrms in 1928. Firms could have compensated for the
loss of an experienced Jew by hiring a manager who had experience running another ﬁrm. The
results show that ﬁrms with a higher fraction of Jewishmanagers in 1932 experienced a statistically
signiﬁcant decline in the number of experienced managers, relative to other ﬁrms (panel b). This
suggests that the ﬁrms did not replace the dismissed Jewish managers with other managers of
similar experience.25
We also examine whether ﬁrms compensated for the loss of Jewish managers who held a uni-
versity degree. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 employed
fewer managers with a university degree after 1933 (panel c). The diﬀerence between ﬁrms with a
higher fraction of Jewish managers and ﬁrms without Jewish managers is statistically signiﬁcant
in 1938. Hence, ﬁrms did not replace the highly educated Jewish managers with similarly educated
non-Jews.
The remaining panels analyze the eﬀect of losing Jewish managers on the connections of man-
agers. We measure connections as the total number of supervisory board positions in other ﬁrms
held by managers of a ﬁrm. These connections are measured contemporaneously, i.e., to measure
connections in 1933 we only use an individual’s supervisory board positions in 1933. Total con-
nections (panel d), connections to ﬁrms in the same industry (panel e), and connections to ﬁrms
in other industries (panel f) dropped sharply and signiﬁcantly in 1933. They remained low until
1938. This shows that ﬁrms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 did not compensate
for the loss of well-connected managers after 1933.
We test the robustness of the graphical analysis by estimating the following diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences speciﬁcation:
loд(Characteristicit ) = β1 Fraction Jewish Manaдers (1932)i × Post 1933t (2)
+ FirmFEi + YearFEt + βc Controlsit + ϵit ,
where Post 1933t is an indicator variable that is equal to one for all years after 1932, and zero other-
wise. Controlsit is a vector of ﬁrm-level control variables, described in detail below. We measure all
controls in 1932, and interact them with year ﬁxed eﬀects, to ensure the control variables cannot
endogenously respond to the removal of the Jewish managers.
25There was a signiﬁcant degree of turnover in senior manager positions, so ﬁrms were in principle able to ﬁnd new
managers. For example, 37 percent of senior managers in 1932 were not employed in the same ﬁrm in 1928, and 30
percent had not held a senior management position in any of the sample ﬁrms in 1928 (Table 1).
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Table 3 presents the results for all manager characteristics, using one panel for each outcome
variable. The speciﬁcations reported in column 1 control for ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The co-
eﬃcients on the interaction of the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 with a post-1933 indicator
are negative and signiﬁcant for all outcome variables, consistent with the graphical evidence. The
average ﬁrm with Jewish managers in 1932 lost 22 percent of its managers after the Nazis came
to power. The point estimate in column 1 of panel A therefore implies that the average ﬁrm with
Jewish managers experienced a decline in the number of managers with tenure since 1928 of ap-
proximately 18 log points.
The speciﬁcations reported in column 2 additionally control for connections to the Nazi Party,
interacted with year ﬁxed eﬀects, to ensure that the diﬀerential treatment of connected ﬁrms by
the Nazis cannot explain the results. The point estimates remain essentially unchanged. We also
add control variables for the timing of a ﬁrm’s publication of ﬁnancial statements (column 3), for
ﬁrm age (column 4), and for the ﬁrm’s nominal capital (column 5). All controls are interacted with
a full set of year ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant and stable, suggesting that the
ﬁndings cannot be explained by shocks that are correlated with ﬁrms’ reporting schedule, age, or
size. The speciﬁcations reported in column 6 add 10 industry ﬁxed eﬀects, interacted with a full
set of year ﬁxed eﬀects. The industry ﬁxed eﬀects account for potential shocks that may have hit
diﬀerent industries in diﬀerent years. The coeﬃcients remain negative and signiﬁcant.
We also estimate results with an alternative treatment variable, a binary indicator for whether
the ﬁrm had any Jewish managers in 1932. The results using the indicator are quantitatively close
to the results using the fraction as treatment variable (Appendix Table A.2). For instance, column
1 reports that the average ﬁrm with Jewish managers experienced a decline in the number of man-
agers with tenure since 1928 of approximately 23 log points, compared to 18 log points implied by
the fraction treatment in Table 3. The point estimates are similar when we add the control vari-
ables. All coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the speciﬁcations with the full set
of controls (column 6).
Taken together, the evidence shows that the removal of Jewish managers had a lasting impact
on the characteristics of managers at ﬁrms that had employed Jewish managers in 1932. In 1938,
these ﬁrms still had fewer managers with ﬁrm-speciﬁc tenure, general managerial experience, a
university degree, and fewer connections to other ﬁrms. The persistent decline in these manager
characteristics up to 1938 is noteworthy, because ﬁrms had up to ﬁve years to replace the Jewish
managers after 1933.26
There are three possible interpretations of these results. First, managers may have all the bar-
gaining power in wage negotiations with the ﬁrm or the managerial labor market may be perfectly
competitive, with only a small role for ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. In both cases, ﬁrms have to
26Appendix Table A.3 shows that the decrease in manager characteristics was not primarily a result of a lower
number of managers overall. There is little evidence that the number of managers evolved diﬀerently at aﬀected ﬁrms,
relative to ﬁrms without Jewish managers.
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fully compensate managers for their marginal product, ﬁrm value is independent of managerial
characteristics, and ﬁrms have no incentive to hire managers with similar characteristics. Under
this extreme interpretation, the loss of Jewish managers would not have aﬀected ﬁrm value.
Second, the manager characteristics we analyze may be beneﬁcial to ﬁrm value. Tenure is likely
associated with ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, while experience and a university education are likely
associated with general human capital. Firm-speciﬁc human capital generates rents for the em-
ployer in standard models (Becker 1964). General human capital can beneﬁt the employer if there
are information frictions on managerial labor markets (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998; Dessein and
Prat 2018). The number of connections could proxy for a manager’s quality, since only reputable
managers may be oﬀered multiple board positions (Cai and Szeidl 2018). In addition, managers
with many connections could improve information ﬂows to providers of inputs and outputs, and
ease collusion among competitors. Despite the beneﬁts, frictions on the labor market for man-
agers may have left ﬁrms unable to adequately replace the Jewish managers. Under this second
interpretation, the loss of the Jewish managers would have harmed ﬁrm value.
A third interpretation views the characteristics we analyze as detrimental to ﬁrm value. Highly
educated and experienced managers may be more skilled at becoming entrenched and extracting
rents from their employers (Shleifer and Vishny 1989). Managers with many connections may be
busier, and hence may enforce weaker corporate governance (Fich and Shivdasani 2006). They may
also have an incentive to seek rents for the other ﬁrms they serve. Even if the detrimental nature
of these characteristics were known, ﬁrms may not choose to endogenously ﬁre their managers,
because ﬁring signals to investors that the ﬁrm is performing poorly or because ﬁring managers
is costly. Under this third interpretation, ﬁrms had no incentive to hire managers with similar
characteristics in place of the Jewish managers. The exogenous removal of the Jewish managers
may have raised ﬁrm value.
The following section allows us to diﬀerentiate between the three interpretations. We analyze
how ﬁrm stock market performance responded to the removal of the Jewish managers. Subse-
quently, we test whether any of the manager characteristics were particularly beneﬁcial or harmful
to the stock market performance of ﬁrms.
4 The Eﬀect of Losing Jewish Managers on Stock Prices
4.1 The Average Eﬀect on Stock Prices
In this section, we investigate the eﬀect on stock prices. We estimate the following regression:
loд(Stock Priceit ) =
1943.5∑
τ=1929.0
βτ Fraction Jewish Manaдers (1932)i × 1 [t (i) = τ ] (3)
+ FirmFEi +TimeFEt + βc Controlsit + ϵit .
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The speciﬁcation is similar to the previous section, but uses the log of the stock price as the outcome
variable.27 As explained in Section 2, we have two observations of the stock price for each ﬁrm
i per year, around January 10th and July 10th. The data cover the years from 1929 to 1943.28 We
exclude January 10, 1933 as the last observation before Hitler became Chancellor on January 30,
1933. We plot the estimated coeﬃcients βτ and the 95 percent conﬁdence intervals in Figure 3.
Panel a shows the coeﬃcients of a speciﬁcation with a full set of ﬁrm and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Panel
b plots the coeﬃcients of a speciﬁcation that further controls for connections to the Nazi Party,
reporting period, ﬁrm age, nominal capital, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects, all measured in 1932 and
interacted with a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects.
The main identifying assumption is that the stock prices of ﬁrms with a higher fraction of
Jewish managers in 1932 would have followed the same trend as the stock prices of ﬁrms without
Jewish managers, if Jewish managers had not been expelled from their ﬁrms. Before January 1933,
the coeﬃcients on the fraction of Jewish managers are small and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. This indicates that the stock prices of ﬁrms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers were
on similar time trends while the Jewish managers were still at their ﬁrms. Firms with a higher
fraction of Jewish managers were not exposed to diﬀerent shocks before 1933, in line with our
identiﬁcation assumption.
After January 1933, the trends diverged. The stock price of the average ﬁrm with a higher
fraction of Jewishmanagers started to decline sharply, compared to the stock price of a ﬁrmwithout
Jewish managers.29 Interestingly, our estimated short-run eﬀect of losing Jewish managers is close
to the initial stock price responses to prominent manager exits in recent times. For example, after
27The results of this section focus on stock price changes, without incorporating dividend payments into the analysis.
We examine the eﬀect of losing Jewish managers on dividends separately in Section 6.1, ﬁnding a negative eﬀect. In
an additional robustness check, we adjust the stock prices for dividends, assuming that investors immediately reinvest
the dividend into the stock (see Appendix B.2.3 for details), and re-estimate equation (3). The adjustment means that
the coeﬃcients measure the eﬀect of losing Jewish managers on the return of investing (on January 10, 1933) into the
average ﬁrm with Jewish managers in 1932, relative to investing into a ﬁrm without Jewish managers in 1932. We use
the adjusted stock prices to construct Appendix Figure A.3. The pattern over time is almost identical to Figure 3. The
point estimate corresponding to Table 4, column 6 using the adjusted stock prices is -0.475 (0.152). The more negative
coeﬃcient is consistent with the ﬁnding that ﬁrms that lost Jewish managers paid out lower dividends after 1933.
28As we have two observations per year, the data contain 30 time periods. Time ﬁxed eﬀects do not refer to years
but refer to January 10th and July 10th of each year, i.e., there are two time ﬁxed eﬀects per year, 29 time ﬁxed eﬀects
overall.
29The stock price of the average ﬁrm with Jewish managers experienced a relative decline of 7.1 log points between
January and July 1933 (Figure 3, panel b). The sharp relative decline is consistent with the timing of events described
in the historical literature. For example, Münzel (2006) documents that “from the very start” of the Nazi reign there
was “radical pressure on elite managers of Jewish origin,” with “more than a third of Jewish executives losing their
positions” by July 1933. Similarly, our manager data show that the average ﬁrm had lost 34 percent of the Jewish
managers it would lose by 1938. The point estimate on the stock price in July 1933 amounts to 51 percent of the July
1938 point estimate. The diﬀerence between the fraction of managers lost and drop in stock prices may be explained
by the sharp decline in the number of connected managers in 1933, as documented in Figure 2. We show that losing
connected managers led to larger eﬀects in Section 4.2 below. In Appendix Figure A.2, we document that German
stock prices were generally rising after 1933, but that they were rising less quickly in ﬁrms with a higher fraction of
Jewish managers in 1933.
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Apple CEO Steve Jobs took permanent medical leave in 2011, the Apple stock fell by 6 percent (BBC
2011). When Fiat Chrysler CEO Sergio Marchionne stepped down due to surgery in 2018, the Fiat
Chrysler stock lost 5 percent (Reuters 2018).
The eﬀects of losing Jewish managers persisted until the end of our stock sample period. The
speciﬁcation with the full set of controls suggests that in January 1943, 10 years after the Nazis
had come to power, the stock price of an average ﬁrm that had employed Jewish managers in 1932
(which lost 22 percent of its managers) was still 11.6 log points below that of a comparable ﬁrm
that had not employed any Jewish managers. The individual point estimate for January 1943 is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1 percent level, as are all of the point estimates from July
1933 onward. The results are similar with and without the controls, strengthening the view that
ﬁrms with Jewish managers were not fundamentally diﬀerent from other ﬁrms, except for losing
Jewish managers.
We also estimate results with the following diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation:
loд(Stock Priceit ) = β1 Fraction Jewish Manaдers (1932)i × Post 1933t (4)
+ FirmFEi +TimeFEt + βc Controlsit + ϵit ,
The regressor of interest is the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for
themonths after January 1933. The point estimate in the speciﬁcation with only ﬁrm and time ﬁxed
eﬀects is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level (Table 4, column 1). The point estimate indicates that after
the Nazis came to power, the stock price of the average ﬁrm that had employed Jewish managers
was 10.3 log points lower after 1933, compared to the stock price of ﬁrms that had not employed
any Jewish managers.30 The addition of the controls in the subsequent columns hardly aﬀects the
coeﬃcient. In particular, we control for an indicator for a connection to the Nazi party, an indicator
for reporting company results in January, ﬁrm age, and nominal capital, all interacted with a full
set of time eﬀects (columns 1-5). Furthermore, we control for a set of 10 industry ﬁxed eﬀects, all
interacted with a full set of time eﬀects (column 6). The eﬀect remains stable and signiﬁcant even
if it is estimated from within-industry variation in the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932. This
oﬀers further evidence that diﬀerential exposure to other shocks cannot explain the eﬀect.
By comparing the 1932 and 1933 editions of Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, we
can identify which ﬁrms lost some of their Jewish managers already in 1933 and which ﬁrms lost
Jewish managers only after 1933. We estimate how this diﬀerential timing aﬀected stock prices.
Firms that lost some of their Jewish managers in 1933 experienced relatively lower stock prices in
1933 (Appendix Table A.4, ﬁrst row of coeﬃcients). In the following years, when these ﬁrms lost
the remaining Jewish managers, their relative stock price declined somewhat further (second row
30In the average ﬁrm that had employed Jewishmanagers in 1932, about 22 percent of managers were Jewish. Hence,
the estimates imply a decline in stock price for the average ﬁrm with Jewish managers of 0.469 * 0.22 * 100 = 10.3 log
points.
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of coeﬃcients). Firms that lost all their Jewish managers after 1933 experienced no relative decline
in stock prices in 1933 (third row of coeﬃcients), but experienced lower stock prices after 1933
(fourth row of coeﬃcients). This suggests that the sharp relative decline in stock prices in 1933
(seen in Figure 3) was entirely driven by ﬁrms that lost managers in 1933. Of course, this result
should be interpretedwith caution, since Jewishmanagersmay have left their ﬁrms for endogenous
reasons. For this reason we use the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 as the treatment variable
in the baseline speciﬁcations. The fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 is immune to endogenous
timing decisions of manager separations. 31
We alternatively measure the ﬁrm’s exposure to Jewish managers using a binary indicator for
whether the ﬁrm employed any Jewish managers in 1932 (Appendix Table A.5). After 1933, ﬁrms
with Jewish managers experienced a relative decline in stock prices of 14.7 log points, an eﬀect
that is comparable to the result using the fraction treatment. The addition of the control variables
hardly aﬀects the point estimate.
The persistent eﬀects of losing Jewish managers on stock prices are consistent with the per-
sistent eﬀects on the characteristics of senior managers found in the previous section. The stock
price results support the view that ﬁrms had gained rents from employing the Jewish managers,
and, hence, that the managers’ salaries did not reﬂect their marginal contribution to their ﬁrms’
market value. Frictions in the labor market presumably left ﬁrms unable to replace managers with
certain characteristics, and this persistently lowered their stock market valuation. Next, we con-
duct a number of robustness checks. We subsequently turn to assessing whether ﬁrms that lost
certain managerial characteristics suﬀered larger stock price declines.
Robustness
In the ﬁrst robustness check, we estimate intensive margin eﬀects, using a sample of ﬁrms that
all employed at least one Jewish manager in 1932. In this sample, the observable characteristics
of ﬁrms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers were similar to ﬁrms with a lower fraction of
Jewish managers (see Table 2, columns 4-5). We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932 in this sample is of similar magnitude but slightly smaller than in the full sample,
and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level (Appendix Table A.6, columns 1-2). Firms with a higher
fraction of Jewish managers were particularly similar to ﬁrms with a lower fraction of Jewish
managers if we additionally exclude the two conglomerate ﬁrms from our sample: the national
railroads Reichsbahn and the chemical producer I.G. Farben (see Table 2, columns 6-7 and Section
2.6). If we use only ﬁrms with at least one Jewish manager and exclude the two conglomerates, the
31Our data on the composition of ﬁrm management cover the years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938 (see Figure 1). We
can therefore explore the exact timing of dismissals by investigating changes between 1932 and 1933 but not for the
subsequent years until 1938. By 1938, virtually all Jewish managers had left their ﬁrms (Figure 1, last bar). While the
results above suggest that the stock market reacted sharply to the timing of dismissals for the ﬁrst wave of dismissals,
the later dismissals may have been more anticipated and hence the dismissal of all Jewish managers seems to have
been priced in by 1937 (see Figure 3, panel b).
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coeﬃcient on the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 is of similar magnitude to the full sample
and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level (Appendix Table A.6, columns 3-4). These intensive margin
results show that diﬀerences between ﬁrms with and without Jewish managers do not drive the
eﬀect of losing Jewish managers.
We also ﬁnd that various ways to control for ﬁrm size do not aﬀect the ﬁndings, including
parametric and non-parametric controls for nominal capital, for the total number of managers, and
for both variables simultaneously (Appendix Table A.7, columns 1-3). There is no heterogeneity in
the eﬀects by ﬁrm size (Appendix Table A.7, columns 4-6). The estimated eﬀect is slightly larger, in
absolute magnitude, if we drop observations from 1932, suggesting that diﬀerential shocks during
the stock market closure cannot explain our ﬁndings (Appendix Table A.8, columns 1-2). For the
baseline results, we average stock prices in a plus-minus 10-day window around January 10th and
July 10th of each year. The results are robust to averaging stock prices in time windows of plus-
minus ﬁve or three days around the respective dates (Appendix Table A.8, columns 3-6). Finally,
the results are robust to averaging stock prices for the whole month of January and July of each
year (Appendix Table A.8, columns 7-8).
Some ﬁrms were not traded in the plus-minus 10 day window around each January 10th and
July 10th, either because the stocks were relatively illiquid, or because ﬁrms were no longer listed
on the Berlin Stock Exchange. The results are robust to restricting the sample to regularly traded
ﬁrms and become even larger, in absolute magnitude, if we restrict the sample to ﬁrms without
any missing observations (Appendix Table A.9).
We investigate whether ﬁrms that lost Jewish managers were more likely to be delisted from
the stock market. We regress an indicator for whether the ﬁrm was delisted after January 1933
on the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932. The coeﬃcient is negative, small, and insigniﬁcant,
indicating that ﬁrms with Jewish managers were not more likely to be delisted (Appendix Table
A.10, column 1). The results are similar if we add the full set of control variables (column 2), or if
we estimate an extended Cox hazard model (columns 3-4).
Appendix Table A.11 explores whether the eﬀects depend on the role of the Jewish managers.
We deﬁne important managers as executive board members and the chair and vice chair of the
supervisory board. Regular managers are the other members of the supervisory board.32 The
point estimate for losing managers in important positions is slightly larger than the point esti-
mate for losing managers in regular positions. However, the estimates are close in magnitude and
not statistically diﬀerent, suggesting that losing managers in both types of positions aﬀects ﬁrm
performance.
32The supervisory board was actively involved in the management of the ﬁrm in the 1930s. Firm founders often held
the chairs and vice chairs of the supervisory board. Until the late 19th century, the supervisory board had been the
main decision maker in German ﬁrms. After a revision of commercial law in 1884, German executive board members
became gradually more important in decision-making (Münzel, 2006, p. 43).
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4.2 The Eﬀect of Losing Managers with Certain Characteristics on Stock
Prices
To investigate whether the loss of certainmanagerial characteristics was responsible for the decline
in stock prices, we estimate the following speciﬁcation:
loд(Stock Priceit ) = β1 · 1[0 < Characteristic Lost due to Losinд Jewish Manaдers < 0.20]i × Post 1933t
+ β2 · 1[0.20 ≤ Characteristic Lost due to Losinд Jewish Manaдers < 0.80]i × Post 1933t
+ β3 · 1[0.80 ≤ Characteristic Lost due to Losinд Jewish Manaдers]i × Post 1933t
+ FirmFEi +TimeFEt + βc Controlsit + ϵit .
(5)
As before, the outcome variable is the log stock price. The three main explanatory variables are
indicators for whether in 1932 Jewish managers were responsible for 1) less than 20 percent, 2)
20 percent to 80 percent, or 3) more than 80 percent of a given managerial characteristic (such
as connections to other ﬁrms). To be clear, if a ﬁrm did not lose any Jewish managers, the three
indicator variables are zero, so that the coeﬃcients on the three indicator variables are estimated
relative to a ﬁrm that did not employ any Jewish managers in 1932. The three indicator variables
are all interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933.33
We start by examining the eﬀect of losing connections to other ﬁrms. After 1933, stock prices
declined by 11.4 log points (signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level) in ﬁrms that lost Jewish managers
but did not lose more than 20 percent of the ﬁrm’s connections (Table 5, column 1), relative to
ﬁrms without Jewish managers in 1932. Stock prices declined by 14.4 log points (signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level) in ﬁrms where the Jewish managers were responsible for 20 percent to less than 80
percent of the ﬁrm’s connections, and by 36.6 log points (signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level) in ﬁrms
where the Jewish managers were responsible for more than 80 percent of the ﬁrm’s connections,
relative to ﬁrms without Jewish managers in 1932.34 The results suggest that ﬁrms that lost a large
share of their managerial connections suﬀered larger declines in stock prices. In line with other
33One concern could be that all ﬁrms that lost a larger share of a given characteristic also lost a larger fraction of
Jewish managers in 1932. In that case, the indicator variables might simply proxy for ﬁrms that lost a high share of
Jewish managers. To test this concern, we ran speciﬁcations where in addition to the three indicator variables, we
include the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The
coeﬃcient on the fraction is statistically insigniﬁcant and positive, while the coeﬃcients on the indicator variables
remain at the same signiﬁcance levels and of similar magnitude to the results presented in this section. This implies
that the indicator variables are not simply proxies for a high fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, but that they capture
additional variation in the characteristics of Jewish managers.
34In unreported results, we analyzed separately whether the eﬀect is driven by losing managers with within- or
outside-industry connections. The point estimates for both types of connections are of similar magnitude, indicating
that losing both within- and outside industry connections had similar eﬀects.
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recent studies, these ﬁndings imply that social capital matters for ﬁrm outcomes, and that it is hard
to replace (Glaeser et al. 2002; Cai and Szeidl 2018; Haselmann et al. 2018).35
Next, we study the eﬀect of losing Jewish managers with a university degree. After 1933, stock
prices declined by 5.2 log points (not signiﬁcant) in ﬁrms that lost Jewish managers but did not
lose more than 20 percent of the ﬁrm’s managers with a degree (Table 5, column 3). Stock prices
declined by 21.4 log points (signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level) in ﬁrms where the Jewish managers
made up 20 percent to less than 80 percent of the ﬁrm’s managers with a degree, and by 62.3 log
points (signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level) in ﬁrms where the Jewish managers made up more than
80 percent of the ﬁrm’s managers with a degree. The results indicate that ﬁrms that lost a large
share of their highly educated managers suﬀered larger declines in stock prices. The results on
losing larger shares of connections and managers with degrees are robust to the inclusion of the
additional control variables (Table 5, columns 2 and 4).
Last, we study the eﬀect of losing Jewish managers with managerial experience since 1928.
The speciﬁcation without controls suggests there is a larger eﬀect for ﬁrms losing a larger share of
experienced managers (Table 5, column 5). However, the inclusion of the control variables renders
the estimates for losing smaller or larger shares of experienced managers similar (Table 5, column
6). For example, the point estimate on losing over 80 percent of experienced managers is statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant and of similar magnitude to the point estimate on losing less than 20 percent of
experienced managers. This suggests that the loss of experienced managers does not account for
most of the average eﬀect of losing Jewish managers.36
To compare the eﬀect of losing diﬀerent manager characteristics more conclusively, we also
estimate speciﬁcations that simultaneously include the indicator variables for all three character-
istics. These speciﬁcations estimate the eﬀect of losing one characteristic, while keeping constant
changes in the other characteristics. Therefore, the results account for potential correlations be-
tween diﬀerent characteristics. For example, managers with many connections may also have
been more educated. The estimates are of similar magnitude compared to the previous speciﬁca-
tions (Table 5, columns 7-8). The coeﬃcients on losing more than 80 percent of connections and
managers with degrees are statistically signiﬁcant with and without the controls. The coeﬃcients
on losing larger shares of experienced managers are statistically insigniﬁcant with and without
the controls. This implies that the earlier results did not rely on spurious correlations between the
diﬀerent managerial characteristics.37
35There is no heterogeneity in the eﬀects by ﬁrm size (Appendix Table A.7, columns 4-6). This suggests that the eﬀect
of losing a large share of managerial connections is not driven by diﬀerences in ﬁrm size or other factors correlated
with ﬁrm size, such as ﬁrm visibility.
36In unreported speciﬁcations, we examine separately whether losing managers with tenure in the ﬁrm or managers
with experience in another ﬁrms has an eﬀect. We ﬁnd little evidence that losing managers with general experience,
ﬁrm-speciﬁc tenure, or experience in another ﬁrm lowered stock prices.
37In unreported results, we vary the deﬁnition of the explanatory variables that indicate a greater loss in the man-
agerial characteristics. For example, we use 25 and 75 percent as the cutoﬀs, or 50 percent. In all these speciﬁcations,
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Overall, the results suggest that managers with many connections and university degrees sig-
niﬁcantly contribute to ﬁrm value. The ﬁndings are consistent with the view that connections and
education are positively correlated with managerial human capital. There is no clear evidence that
a loss of experienced managers harms ﬁrm value, as long as the reduction in managerial experi-
ence is not accompanied by a reduction in the connections and the education level of managers.
This ﬁnding could indicate that the positive eﬀects of experience on ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital
are outweighed by the negative eﬀects of experience through rent-seeking and entrenchment.
The coeﬃcients on ﬁrms with Jewish managers that lost less than 20 percent of all three man-
agerial characteristics are positive, close to zero, and statistically insigniﬁcant in columns 7 and
8. Hence, losing Jewish managers per se had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on stock prices. This is a key
ﬁnding, which validates our identiﬁcation strategy. One may be concerned that ﬁrms with Jewish
managers in 1932 suﬀered from other shocks after 1933. Potential shocks that may be correlated
with a higher fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 include, for example, repression by the Nazi
government, diﬀerent exposure to government policies, consumer retail boycotts, a loss of lower-
ranked Jewish employees, or a loss of Jewish customers. But the results in columns 7 and 8 show
that ﬁrms with Jewish managers in 1932 and ﬁrms with no Jewish managers in 1932 remained on
similar trends after 1933, unless Jewish managers were responsible for a large share of the ﬁrm’s
highly educated or connected managers. This suggests that ﬁrms with Jewish managers were not
exposed to other shocks after the Nazis came to power, apart from losing managers with certain
characteristics. The following section presents further evidence that other potential shocks to ﬁrms
do not account for the eﬀects on stock prices.
4.3 Alternative Explanations for the Eﬀect on Stock Prices
The results in the previous subsections indicate that the removal of connected and educated Jewish
managers led to declines in ﬁrms’ stock prices. The absence of an eﬀect for ﬁrms that lost neither a
large share of connected nor of educated Jewish managers already suggests that correlated shocks
do not drive the estimated eﬀect of losing Jewish managers. In this section, we further explore
whether the decline in stock prices was driven by the removal of Jewish managers or whether
ﬁrms with Jewish managers suﬀered from other shocks after 1933 that were correlated with the
fraction of Jewish managers in 1932. We consider two types of shocks: those resulting from other
discriminatory measures against Jews, and those arising from other shocks to the demand for the
products of some ﬁrms.
4.3.1 Other Discrimination Against Jews
Other discriminatory measures against Jews in Nazi Germany may have disproportionately af-
fected ﬁrms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers. We explore this possibility with ﬁve tests.
the point estimates on losing a larger share of connections and university-educated managers are negative, while the
point estimates on losing any share of experienced managers are small and mostly positive.
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First, we estimate the eﬀect of losing Jewish managers for ﬁrms that were favored by the Nazi gov-
ernment. Second, we measure which ﬁrms were perceived as “Jewish” and explore how the eﬀect
of losing Jewish managers changes if we control for post-1933 changes in stock prices of “Jewish”
ﬁrms. Third, we analyze eﬀects in sectors and areas with very few lower-ranked Jewish employees.
Fourth, we analyze eﬀects for ﬁrms without large Jewish shareholders. Finally, we investigate the
eﬀect of losing managers in a sample of ﬁrms that were not aﬀected by antisemitic boycotts in the
retail sector.
Eﬀect in a Sample of Firms Favored by the Nazi Government
In a ﬁrst test, we restrict the sample to ﬁrms that were favored by the Nazi regime. It is likely that
these ﬁrms were not exposed to repressive measures by the Nazi government, but rather experi-
enced political support after 1933. We identify ﬁrms favored by the Nazi government based on three
criteria. First, we include ﬁrms that had managers who made ﬁnancial contributions or provided
political support to Hitler, Göring, or the Nazi Party before 1933. This measure was developed by
Ferguson and Voth (2008). Examples of such ﬁrms are the insurance company Allianz and the car
manufacturer Daimler Benz. Second, we include ﬁrms that received forced labor workers from the
Nazi government. This measure is based on the “Catalogue of Camps and Prisons in Germany and
German-occupied Territories 1939-1945.” Examples of such ﬁrms are I.G. Farben and the oil and
gas company Deutsche Öl. Third, we exclude ﬁrms that the German public or the Nazi government
perceived as “Jewish” (see below for the deﬁnition of “Jewish” ﬁrms) from this sample. Overall,
this sample includes 171 ﬁrms that were favored by the Nazis.
Despite the fact that this sample of ﬁrms ismuch smaller than the full sample, the eﬀect of losing
Jewishmanagers remains signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level in the speciﬁcation with all controls. The
point estimate is somewhat larger than in the full sample (Table 6). Hence, losing Jewish managers
aﬀected stock prices in a similar way even in a sample of ﬁrms that were not negatively exposed
to government repression in Nazi Germany.
Discrimination Against Firms Perceived as “Jewish”
In a second test, we analyze ﬁrms that were associated with Judaism more generally. Such ﬁrms
may have suﬀered after the Nazis came to power, for example because of antisemitic measures by
the government or because they suﬀered from consumer boycotts against Jewish ﬁrms. To test this
possibility, we identify a group of ﬁrms that contemporaries explicitly named as “Jewish ﬁrms.” We
systematically record all ﬁrms that are mentioned as being connected to Jews or Judaism in a range
of historical sources about Jews in Germany (Bruer 1927; Landsberg 1927a,b; Priester 1927; Mosse
1987).38 The majority of these “Jewish ﬁrms” had a Jewish founder, for example the department
38As the historical sources only cover certain industries, we augment the deﬁnition of “Jewish ﬁrms” with the
deﬁnition of “Jewish ﬁrms” in Mosse (1987), the standard reference on Jews in the German economy. All results hold
if we focus on the deﬁnition that relies only on the contemporary sources.
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store Leonhard Tietz, which was founded by the Jewish merchant of the same name, or Allgemeine
Electricitätsgesellschaft, one of the largest electrical companies in the world, which was founded by
the Jewish industrialist Emil Rathenau.39
We separately analyze the evolution of the stock prices of Jewish ﬁrms (Table 7). We ﬁnd
negative but insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients for the stock prices of Jewish ﬁrms after 1933 (columns 1-2).
The pattern becomes clearer when we separately consider the period after 1935. The stock prices
of Jewish ﬁrms hardly changed in 1933 and 1934, but declined signiﬁcantly by 12.7 log points
after 1935 (columns 3-4). These ﬁndings are consistent with historical accounts: During the early
years of Nazi rule, large Jewish ﬁrms were not harmed by policies of the government because the
Nazi government wanted to boost employment and did not target any ﬁrms that were vital for the
economic recovery (James 2001, p. 38). After passing the Nuremberg racial laws in 1935, however,
the Nazi government explicitly began to target large ﬁrms perceived to be Jewish (Barkai 1990, p.
83; Strauss 1999, p. XVII; James 2001, p. 38).
Importantly, controlling for Jewish ﬁrms does not aﬀect the post-1933 coeﬃcient on the fraction
of Jewish managers in 1932 (Table 7, columns 5-6). These results indicate that Jewish ﬁrms indeed
suﬀered in Nazi Germany, but that the eﬀect on Jewish ﬁrms was orthogonal to the eﬀect of losing
Jewish managers.
To further explore the development of Jewish ﬁrms over time, we run a speciﬁcation akin to
equation 3 and additionally include an indicator for Jewish ﬁrms, interacted with a full set of time
ﬁxed eﬀects. Appendix Figure A.4 plots the point estimates on the indicator for Jewish ﬁrms over
time. Stock prices of Jewish ﬁrms remained constant until January 1935, and then started to de-
cline. They reached their lowest point in 1939. By 1943, they had fully recovered. The recovery
of stock prices of Jewish ﬁrms suggests that discriminatory measures against these ﬁrms had only
temporary eﬀects, which lasted until they were taken over by non-Jews and were not any more
associated with Judaism. In contrast, the stock prices of ﬁrms that lost Jewish managers remained
persistently low, even after all Jewish managers had left their ﬁrms by 1938.
Taken together, these ﬁndings imply that the eﬀect of losing Jewish managers cannot be ex-
plained by other shocks that hit “Jewish ﬁrms.” This is hardly surprising. Many ﬁrms that had
employed managers of Jewish origin were not perceived to be “Jewish” in any way by the Nazis or
the public, and hence unlikely to face direct repression or shocks to demand. These ﬁrms included,
for example, BMW, Deutsche Reichsbahn, or I.G. Farben. They happened to employ managers of
Jewish origin and as a result suﬀered from losing their Jewish managers but not from other dis-
criminatory measures.
39The average fraction of managers with Jewish origin was slightly higher in “Jewish ﬁrms” compared to other
ﬁrms (22 versus 13 percent), but there was signiﬁcant variation in both groups. The 1st to 99th percentile range of the
percentage of Jewish managers was from 0 to 50 percent for “Jewish ﬁrms,”, and from 0 to 58 percent for other ﬁrms.
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Discrimination Against Lower-Ranked Jewish Employees
In a third test, we explore whether the stock prices of ﬁrms with Jewish managers declined be-
cause the loss of Jewish managers was correlated with discrimination against lower-ranked Jewish
employees. There are no consistent data on the number of lower-ranked Jewish employees for
ﬁrms that were listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange. We therefore collect data on the share of
Jews among lower-ranked employees from historical statistics published by the German Statistical
Agency (Statistisches Reichsamt, see Appendix B.3 for details). These data are based on the 1933
census and report the fraction of Jews by sector (manufacturing or services) and region or large city
(for example, Berlin, Hamburg, Breslau, Königsberg). Whenever we are able to use the city-level
information, we do so (for about 33 percent of the sample). Otherwise, we use regional information.
The data allow us to estimate the eﬀect of losing Jewish managers for ﬁrms in region-sector
cells with very low fractions of lower-ranked Jewish employees (Appendix Table A.12). We ﬁrst
focus on ﬁrms in region-sector cells with the lowest quartile of Jewish blue collar workers (columns
1-2). Next, we focus on ﬁrms in region-sector cells with the lowest quartile of lower-ranked Jewish
white collar workers (columns 3-4).40 In both samples, the post-1933 coeﬃcient on the fraction of
Jewish managers in 1932 is larger in absolute magnitude than in the baseline. Despite the small
sample sizes, the coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant at the 5 or 10 percent levels.
Finally, we estimate the eﬀect for ﬁrms in region-sector cells with the lowest quartiles of both
measures of lower-ranked Jewish employees. In this sample, the percentage of Jews is only 0.22
percent among blue collar workers and 0.02 percent among lower-ranked white collar workers
(Appendix Figure A.5). In contrast, the fraction of Jewish managers is still 10.7 percent in this
sample (compared to 13.8 percent in the full sample). In this sample, the post-1933 coeﬃcient on
the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 is larger in absolute magnitude than in the baseline and
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Overall, these results suggest that the underperformance of ﬁrms
that lost Jewish managers was not predominantly driven by a reduction in the supply of lower-
ranked Jewish employees.
Discrimination Against Jewish Shareholders
In a fourth test, we explore whether the stock prices of ﬁrms with Jewish managers declined be-
cause the fraction of Jewishmanagers in 1932was correlatedwith the presence of Jewish sharehold-
ers in 1932. There is no complete register of shareholders for this time period, but the Handbuch
der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften 1932 lists large shareholders for the ﬁrms in our sample. For ex-
ample, the industrial property developer Königstadt AG lists two large shareholders: Bank für Brau
40Lower-ranked white collar workers do not contain the senior managers that are the focus of our analysis because
high-level white color workers are separately listed in the census data.
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and the Jewish private bank Gebrüder Arnhold. We identify all Jewish individuals or ﬁrms (such as
Jewish private banks) that were large shareholders in any of the sample ﬁrms.41
We drop all ﬁrms that had a large Jewish shareholder in 1932 from the sample. The coeﬃcient
on the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 is slightly larger but of similar magnitude than in the
full sample, and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level (Appendix Table A.13). This implies
that “ﬁre sales” of large blocks of stocks by Jewish shareholders do not aﬀect the estimated eﬀect
of losing Jewish managers. This ﬁnding is consistent with the historical literature, which suggests
that Jewish private banks and other Jewish shareholders were not able to sell their stocks, but that
their stock portfolios were mostly seized and redistributed as a whole.42
Discrimination by Retail Customers
In a ﬁfth test, we consider potential discrimination by retail customers that may have been cor-
related with the fraction of Jewish managers. We focus on antisemitic customer boycotts that
disproportionately hit retail ﬁrms by estimating results for non-retailers only. In this restricted
sample, the results are similar to the baseline results (Table 8, columns 1-2). This suggests that
customer discrimination cannot explain why ﬁrms with Jewish managers experienced declines in
stock prices.
4.3.2 Correlated Demand Shocks (Not Directly Related to Discrimination)
Next, we explore whether other demand shocks, that were not directly caused by discrimination
against Jews, may have disproportionately aﬀected ﬁrms with a higher fraction of Jewish man-
agers in 1932. Such demand shocks may have been caused by increased government spending in
re-armament and infrastructure, or because international customers retaliated against ﬁrms that
dismissed their Jewish managers.
Rearmament Spending
Soon after gaining power, the Nazi government started amassive rearmament program. Armament
spending increased from about 0.8 billion RM in 1932 to 30 billion in 1939 (Carroll 1968). To analyze
demand shocks caused by armament spending, we estimate results for samples of ﬁrms that were
unlikely to be aﬀected by such shocks. First, we exclude all ﬁrms that the Reichswehr had identiﬁed
41We classify ﬁrms as having a large Jewish shareholder if an individual shareholder was of Jewish origin (as deﬁned
in Section 2.1), if an institutional shareholder was perceived as a “Jewish ﬁrm” (as deﬁned in Section 4.3.1), or if the
institutional shareholder was Jewish private bank (as listed in Köhler 2008).
42We test the historical accounts further in unreported speciﬁcations. We use the full sample of ﬁrms and include
an additional treatment variable: an indicator for having a large Jewish shareholder interacted with a post-1933 indi-
cator. The coeﬃcient on this additional variable is small and insigniﬁcant in speciﬁcations with or without additional
regressors. For instance, the coeﬃcient is 0.027 (0.058), conditional on all the controls and on the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932 interacted with a post-1933 indicator. This shows that having a large Jewish shareholder did not
aﬀect stock prices after 1933, conﬁrming the historical narrative.
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as important for rearmament.43 The results remain almost unchanged in this sample (Table 8,
columns 3-4).
Second, we exclude all ﬁrms in industries that were relevant for rearmament and hence most
ﬁrms that may have been aﬀected directly or indirectly by increased armament spending. In par-
ticular, we exclude all ﬁrms in iron and steel production, machine tools, and chemicals. Despite
dropping about half of all ﬁrms in our baseline sample, the coeﬃcient remains similar to the base-
line eﬀect (Table 8, columns 5-6).
Infrastructure Investments
The new government also invested heavily in infrastructure works of various kinds, especially in-
frastructure that would be useful during a war: strategic roads (the famous Autobahn), airﬁelds,
barracks, and waterways (Tooze 2008, p. 45). We therefore estimate results in a sample of ﬁrms
that were unlikely to beneﬁt from large infrastructure investments by excluding all ﬁrms in con-
struction. The results are similar to the baseline results (Table 8, columns 7-8).
Reduced Demand by International Customers
We consider whether lower demand by non-government actors from abroad may have dispropor-
tionately hit ﬁrms with a larger fraction of Jewish managers. In particular, we analyze whether
ﬁrms with international activities may have suﬀered diﬀerential shocks after 1933. International
customers may have reacted to the rise of the Nazis or to the removal of Jewish managers by reduc-
ing demand for the products of ﬁrms that had employed Jewish managers. Alternatively, interna-
tional trading partners may have been less willing to work with German ﬁrms that had dismissed
their Jewish managers. The Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften 1932 includes a written
narrative about each ﬁrm. We code international ﬁrms as those ﬁrms that reported “imports,” “ex-
ports,” or “foreign activity” as part of their business activities. For example, the large brewery Dort-
munder Actien-Brauerei reported “beer export: to Holland, France, Belgium, and overseas” among
its business activities. We estimate the eﬀect of losing Jewish managers in the sample of ﬁrms
without international business activities. In this sample, the results remain similar to the baseline
results (Table 8, columns 9-10). This suggests that shocks to ﬁrms with international operations
cannot explain the eﬀect of losing Jewish managers.
Firm-Speciﬁc Demand Shocks
Finally, we investigate whether ﬁrm-speciﬁc product demand shocks may have disproportion-
ately hit ﬁrms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers. The Handbuch der deutschen Aktienge-
sellschaften 1941 provides narrative histories that describe each ﬁrm’s development between 1933
43We identify ﬁrms that may have beneﬁted from increased armament spending based on a list of ﬁrms that the
Reichswehr had identiﬁed as important for rearmament production, as summarized in two lists published in Hansen
(1978). Anlage Nr. 6, pp. 217 reports ﬁrms that prepared for the production of armament material in 1927/28. Anlage
Nr. 10, pp. 226 reports ﬁrms that were important providers of inputs for armaments production in 1931. We exclude
all ﬁrms that were named in any of the two lists.
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and 1941. Part of the narrative histories are discussions of changes in demand for the ﬁrms’ prod-
ucts. We carefully read the narrative of each ﬁrm and identify all positive or negative demand
shocks. For example, the entry for Königsberger Lagerhaus describes that a record agricultural
yield in Eastern Germany raised demand for the services of the storage and transport company.
In the opposite direction, the cement producers Breitenburger Portland-Cement-Fabrik and Stettiner
Portland-Cement-Fabrik describe how cold and long winters in certain parts of Germany reduced
construction and therefore reduced demand for these ﬁrms. Other demand shocks were caused by
public policy. For example, the local government made the river Donau between Ulm and Kelheim
more easily navigable by ship, which allowed the shipping company Rhein-Main-Donau A.-G. to
sell more of its services. We exclude from the sample all ﬁrms for which we identify at least one
ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand shock between 1933 and 1941 (Table 8, columns 11-12). The coeﬃcient on
losing Jewish managers remains stable and signiﬁcant. This suggests that ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand
shocks, as recorded in Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, do not explain the eﬀects.
5 The Eﬀect on the Aggregate Market Valuation of Listed
Firms
A back-of-the-envelope calculation allows us to estimate the aggregate decrease in market val-
uation of ﬁrms listed in Berlin due to the loss of Jewish managers. The calculation relies on the
assumption that ﬁrms without Jewish managers were not aﬀected by the removal of Jewish man-
agers from other ﬁrms. In other words, the assumption is that there were no spillover eﬀects
from aﬀected ﬁrms to ﬁrms without Jewish managers. Positive spillovers may exist because ﬁrms
without Jewish managers could have taken over market share from ﬁrms in their industry that
lost Jewish managers. Negative spillovers may exist in the form of reduced productivity spillovers
among ﬁrms in the same industry, lower regional aggregate demand, or because ﬁrms that had
employed Jewish managers poached managers from unaﬀected ﬁrms.
We explore the plausibility of the assumption of no spillovers by testing for spillovers within
industries and within regions. We estimate regressions based on versions of equation 4 and report
the results in Appendix Table A.14. The regressors of interest include the original regressor (the
ﬁrm’s fraction of Jewishmanagers) and the average fraction of Jewishmanagers in all other ﬁrms in
the industry or the region, all interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. While
the coeﬃcients on the ﬁrm’s fraction of Jewish managers are stable and statistically signiﬁcant, the
coeﬃcients on the industry- and region-level fractions of Jewish managers are all insigniﬁcant and
negative. There is no evidence that positive spillovers played an important role. If anything, the
negative coeﬃcients suggest that spillovers ampliﬁed the negative ﬁrm-level eﬀects of removing
the Jewish managers. Papers by Moretti (2010), Greenstone et al. (2010), Bloom et al. (2013b), and
Huber (2018) similarly suggest that spillover eﬀects tend to amplify the eﬀects of ﬁrm-level shocks.
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Negative spillovers would imply that the following calculation underestimates the aggregate loss
to the German economy.
The aggregate market capitalization of ﬁrms in the sample was approximately 20.1 billion Re-
ichsmark, based on data of the market capitalization of ﬁrms from January 1933 or the closest
available month before January 1933. The average fraction of Jewish managers for all ﬁrms in
the sample was 0.14 in 1932 (Table 2). The point estimate for the eﬀect of the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932 on the average log stock prices after 1933 is -0.46 (Table 4, column 6). This im-
plies a decrease of 36.87 percent (= 100 · [e−0.46 − 1]) if the ﬁrm lost all its managers. Multiplying
the percentage decrease with the average fraction of Jewish managers results in a 5.16 percent
(= −36.87 · 0.14) decline in the stock price of the average ﬁrm. Multiplying this average decline
with the total market capitalization in January 1933 gives an approximate loss of market valuation
of 1.04 billion (= 0.0516 · 20.1) Reichsmark due to the stock price decrease. German gross national
product in 1933 was 58.4 billion Reichsmark (Räth 2009), so the stock price drop due to the removal
of the Jewish managers reduced the market valuation of ﬁrms by 1.78 percent of the gross national
product. This number is likely an underestimate of the aggregate loss to the German economy due
to aggregate antisemitic discrimination, since the expulsion of Jews aﬀected the economy through
more channels than just the loss of managers in ﬁrms listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange.
6 The Eﬀect of Losing Jewish Managers on Dividends and
Returns on Assets
6.1 Dividends
In the previous sections, we presented evidence that the loss of Jewish managers changed the char-
acteristics of ﬁrms’ senior management and reduced ﬁrms’ stock prices. We now turn to assessing
the eﬀect on additional measures of ﬁrm performance. The ﬁrst measure is the dividend paid to
investors. Together with stock price changes, the dividend determines the return of a stock to in-
vestors. The dividend also conveys information about the proﬁtability of a ﬁrm, since it is usually
paid out of ﬁrm proﬁts. We use annual data on the dividend payments of all 655 ﬁrms in our sample
for the years 1929 to 1943 (see Section 2.3 for details). The dividend is reported as a percentage of
the nominal stock value. We estimate speciﬁcations equivalent to equation 4, using dividends as
the dependent variable. As the dividend information is reported at yearly intervals, we replace the
time ﬁxed eﬀects with year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Firms that lost a higher fraction of Jewish managers lowered dividend payments after 1933,
but the eﬀect is imprecisely estimated in the speciﬁcation without controls (Table 9, column 1).
Adding the controls renders the eﬀect signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5 percent level. The
point estimate indicates that the average ﬁrm with Jewish managers (which lost 22 percent of its
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managers) paid a dividend that was on average 0.34 percentage points lower from 1933 onward
(Table 9, column 2). The average dividend paid by all ﬁrms in the sample was 4.6 percent, so the
average ﬁrm with Jewish managers reduced its dividends by around 7.5 percent after 1933.
The speciﬁcations using the binary treatment indicator estimate a slightly larger decrease in the
dividend for the average ﬁrm with Jewish managers (Table 9, columns 3-4). The point estimate in
column 4, conditional on all controls, implies a decrease in the average dividend after 1933 of 0.46
percentage points, a 10 percent drop relative to the average dividend paid by ﬁrms in the sample.
The eﬀect on the stock price of the average ﬁrm with Jewish managers was 10.2 log points (Table
4, column 6), so the decrease in dividends was of similar proportional magnitude to the drop in
stock prices. This suggests that investors priced the stocks proportionately to the dividends.
6.2 Returns on Assets
We also examine how the loss of Jewish managers aﬀected ﬁrms’ returns on assets, which is the
ratio of proﬁts before interest payments and taxes to total assets. The return on assets is a com-
monly used measure of the performance of ﬁrm managers, because it captures how eﬃciently the
ﬁrm uses its available assets to generate proﬁts (see Section 2.4 for details on the data). We estimate
speciﬁcations equivalent to equation 4, but use the return on assets measured in 1931, 1936, and
1940 as the dependent variable.
In the speciﬁcation with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects, the coeﬃcient on the fraction of Jewish
managers interacted with a post-1933 indicator is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level
(Table 9, column 5). In the speciﬁcation with all controls, the coeﬃcient is also signiﬁcant at the 5
percent level. The point estimate implies that the return on assets of the average ﬁrm with Jewish
managers was 4.1 percentage points lower after 1933 (Table 9, column 6). The speciﬁcation with
the binary treatment indicator estimates a similar decrease of 5.3 percentage points for the average
ﬁrm with Jewish managers, which is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level (Table 9, column 8).
Overall, the evidence in this section indicates that the eﬀect of losing Jewish managers went
beyond stock prices. The reductions in dividends and returns on assets show that the ﬁrms were
less proﬁtable and less eﬃcient after losing the Jewish managers.
7 Conclusion
We study the economic eﬀects of discrimination against Jewish managers in German ﬁrms.
Our analysis relies on newly digitized data, based on a large number of historical sources. We
collect information on the characteristics of senior managers at all ﬁrms listed on the Berlin Stock
Exchange in 1932, as well as stock prices, dividend payments, and returns on assets of these ﬁrms.
The removal of the Jewish managers, caused by rising antisemitism after the Nazis came to
power in 1933, negatively aﬀected German ﬁrms, including some of the largest and most important
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corporations. The observable characteristics of senior managers changed in long-lasting ways in
ﬁrms that had employed Jewishmanagers. For example, the number of managers with ﬁrm-speciﬁc
tenure, general experience, and a university education, as well as the total number of managerial
connections to other ﬁrms fell. After 1933, the stock prices of aﬀected ﬁrms dropped sharply and
remained low until the end of our sample period in 1943. The dividend payments and the returns
on assets of aﬀected ﬁrms also decreased, indicating that ﬁrms were less proﬁtable and eﬃcient
because they were unable to replace the Jewish managers adequately. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation implies that removing the Jewish managers caused large reductions in the aggregate
market valuation of listed ﬁrms.
The ﬁndings of this paper inform our understanding of how discrimination can cause real eco-
nomic harm, by leading to the removal of highly qualiﬁed business leaders. We study arguably the
most severe form of discrimination against a particular group of individuals, but even less severe
forms of discrimination can lead to a loss of talent. As highlighted above, the travel ban on citizens
of sevenMuslim-majority countries in the United States or the persecution of Turkish businessmen
who follow the cleric Fethullah Gulen are current examples of rising discrimination that are likely
to aﬀect ﬁrms. Even the perception of not being welcome in a country may lead to an outﬂow of
highly qualiﬁed individuals with similar consequences. A recent survey in the wake of the Brexit
referendum suggests, for example, that 12 percent of continental Europeans who make between
£100,001 ($130,000) and £200,000 a year were planning to leave the United Kingdom in the coming
years (The Economist 2017a). The results in our paper indicate that such an exodus would have
large economic consequences.
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Figures
Figure 1: Percentage of Jewish Managers over Time
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Notes: The ﬁgure reports the percentage of senior management positions that were held by Jewish managers in the 655 ﬁrms
that were listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange.
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Figure 2: The Effect of Losing Jewish Managers on Manager Characteristics
(a) Tenure as Manager since 1928
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(b) Experience as Manager since 1928
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(c) Managers with Degree
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(d) Connections
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(e) Connections - Same Industry
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(f) Connections - Other Industries
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Notes: The ﬁgure reports yearly coeﬃcients (βτ ) and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals from equation 1. Each panel reports
results for diﬀerent dependent variables, which are indicated in the heading of the panel. The dependent variables are in
natural logarithms. Themain explanatory variables are the fraction of Jewishmanagers in 1932, interacted with a ﬁxed eﬀect
for each year. The interaction with 1932, the last year before the Nazis gained power, is the excluded interaction. Coeﬃcients
and standard errors are scaled to reﬂect the eﬀect on the average ﬁrm with Jewish managers in 1932. The average such ﬁrm
lost 22 percent of its managers after 1932. All regressions include ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered
at the ﬁrm level.
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Figure 3: The Effect of Losing Jewish Managers on Stock Prices
(a) With Firm and Year Fixed Eﬀects
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(b) With All Controls
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
Ef
fe
ct
 o
f L
os
in
g 
22
%
 o
f M
an
ag
er
s
1929 1931 1933 1935 1937 1939 1941 1943
Notes: The ﬁgure reports coeﬃcients (βτ ) and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals from equation 3. The dependent variable is
the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day window around January 10th and
July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variables are the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with a ﬁxed
eﬀect for each time period. The interaction with January 1933, the last period before the Nazis gained power, is the excluded
interaction. Coeﬃcients and standard errors are scaled to reﬂect the eﬀect on the average ﬁrmwith Jewish managers in 1932.
The average such ﬁrm lost 22 percent of its managers after 1932. Panel (a) controls for ﬁrm and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Panel
(b) additionally controls for an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the ﬁrm published
its 1932 ﬁnancial statement in January, ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in 1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All these
additional controls are interacted with a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Managers in 1932
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Jewish Managers
All Jewish Non-Jewish in Firms with
Managers Managers Managers Jewish Managers
Number of senior management positions 7,791 1,230 6,561 4,426
Number of senior managers 4,873 423 4,450 2,902
Manager characteristics (manager level):
% managers with university degree 36.18 45.15 35.33 37.35
% managers with Kommerzienrat title 4.72 8.75 4.34 4.62
% managers with tenure since 1928 62.59 70.92 61.80 61.06
% managers with experience since 1928 69.61 82.98 68.34 68.47
Avg. number of supervisory board positions 1.26 2.90 1.11 1.16
Notes: The data on managers are for the year 1932 and were collected from various historical sources (see Section 2 for
details).
Table 2: Summary Statistics on Firms in 1932
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No Jewish At Least One Jewish
All Firms Managers Manager
All Fraction Jewish Managers Fraction Jewish Managers
≤ Median > Median ≤ Median > Median
Without Conglomerates
Number of ﬁrms 655 247 408 215 193 213 193
Number of senior managers 11.89 8.64 13.86 13.56 14.20 13.24 14.20
Number of Jewish senior managers 1.88 0.00 3.01 1.61 4.58 1.58 4.58
Fraction of Jewish senior managers 0.14 0.00 0.22 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33
Number of managers with tenure since 1928 7.54 5.43 8.82 8.40 9.29 8.14 9.29
Number of managers with experience since 1928 9.21 6.37 10.92 10.41 11.50 10.14 11.50
Number of managers with degree 4.94 3.11 6.06 5.71 6.44 5.47 6.44
Number of connections 37.57 16.98 50.04 40.71 60.43 40.27 60.43
Number of connections to the same industry 15.97 9.50 19.89 17.96 22.04 17.78 22.04
Number of connections to other industries 21.60 7.48 30.15 22.75 38.39 22.49 38.39
Nazi connection 0.17 0.09 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.20
Nominal capital (in million RM) 36.30 4.71 55.43 91.69 15.03 17.47 15.03
Firm age (in years) 42.06 42.89 41.55 40.95 42.23 41.25 42.23
Balance sheet reported in January 0.68 0.66 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.70 0.68
Notes: The data on managers, their characteristics, and control variables are for the year 1932 and were collected from
various historical sources (see Section 2 for details).
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Table 3: The Effect on the Characteristics of Firms’ Senior Management
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dep. Variable: log(# of Managers with Tenure since 1928), # of obs./ﬁrms: 2407/655
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.840*** -0.835*** -0.831*** -0.830*** -0.830*** -0.813***
× Post 1933 (0.110) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.113)
R2 0.747 0.747 0.749 0.749 0.749 0.757
Panel B: Dep. Variable: log(# of Managers with Experience since 1928), # of obs./ﬁrms: 2487/655
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.586*** -0.601*** -0.599*** -0.598*** -0.594*** -0.597***
× Post 1933 (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.105) (0.107)
R2 0.660 0.663 0.663 0.665 0.665 0.681
Panel C: Dep. Variable: log(# of Managers with Degree), # of obs./ﬁrms: 2400/645
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.272** -0.257** -0.257** -0.256** -0.255** -0.218**
× Post 1933 (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109)
R2 0.016 0.022 0.022 0.029 0.029 0.053
Panel D: Dep. Variable: log(# of Connections), # of obs./ﬁrms: 2530/655
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.812*** -0.808*** -0.813*** -0.811*** -0.812*** -0.746***
× Post 1933 (0.136) (0.136) (0.137) (0.138) (0.138) (0.141)
R2 0.220 0.222 0.230 0.232 0.233 0.253
Panel E: Dep. Variable: log(# of Connections to Firms in the Same Ind.), # of obs./ﬁrms: 2530/655
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.474*** -0.471*** -0.478*** -0.476*** -0.475*** -0.386***
× Post 1933 (0.095) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098)
R2 0.166 0.169 0.174 0.181 0.182 0.228
Panel F: Dep. Variable: log(# of Connections to Firms in Diﬀerent Ind.), # of obs./ﬁrms: 2291/640
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -1.091*** -1.086*** -1.089*** -1.084*** -1.084*** -1.046***
× Post 1933 (0.191) (0.191) (0.191) (0.191) (0.192) (0.195)
R2 0.178 0.179 0.185 0.187 0.188 0.212
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nazi Connection × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reporting Period × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Age × Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Nominal Capital × Time FE Yes Yes
Industry FE × Time FE Yes
Notes: The Table reports point estimates (β1) from equation 2 for diﬀerent dependent variables, which are indicated in the
heading of each panel. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with
an indicator for the years after 1932. The control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an
indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its 1932 ﬁnancial statement in January, ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in
1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All controls are interacted with a full set of year ﬁxed eﬀects. The data include the years
1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗
p<0.1.
43
Table 4: The Effect on Stock Prices
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.469*** -0.459*** -0.458*** -0.479*** -0.479*** -0.464***
× Post 1933 (0.138) (0.136) (0.136) (0.134) (0.134) (0.138)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nazi Connection × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reporting Period × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Age × Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Nominal Capital × Time FE Yes Yes
Industry FE × Time FE Yes
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 655 655
R2 0.566 0.569 0.570 0.580 0.582 0.622
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The control variables include: an indicator
for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its 1932 ﬁnancial statement in January,
ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in 1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All controls are interacted with a full set of time
ﬁxed eﬀects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at
the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 5: The Effect of Losing Managers with Certain Characteristics on Stock
Prices
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0 < Lost Characteristics at Firm with Jewish Manager (1932) < 0.20 -0.114* -0.082 -0.052 -0.037 -0.111** -0.093* 0.000 0.058
× Post 1933 (0.064) (0.061) (0.047) (0.046) (0.055) (0.050) (0.069) (0.065)
0.20 ≤ Connections Lost < 0.80 -0.144*** -0.133*** -0.019 -0.013
× Post 1933 (0.046) (0.045) (0.060) (0.057)
0.80 ≤ Connections Lost -0.366*** -0.359*** -0.203* -0.191*
× Post 1933 (0.109) (0.098) (0.119) (0.107)
0.20 ≤ Degrees Lost < 0.80 -0.214*** -0.199*** -0.180*** -0.167***
× Post 1933 (0.053) (0.051) (0.067) (0.064)
0.80 ≤ Degrees Lost -0.623*** -0.733*** -0.554*** -0.668***
× Post 1933 (0.208) (0.209) (0.210) (0.214)
0.20 ≤ Experienced Managers Lost < 0.80 -0.170*** -0.163*** 0.019 0.016
× Post 1933 (0.048) (0.047) (0.077) (0.065)
0.80 ≤ Experienced Managers Lost -0.385*** -0.110 -0.179 0.081
× Post 1933 (0.077) (0.170) (0.118) (0.198)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 655 655 655 655
R2 0.567 0.623 0.572 0.629 0.566 0.622 0.573 0.630
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variables in columns 1 to 6 are indicators
for whether losing Jewish managers reduced the value of the given managerial characteristic by: 1) less than 20 percent, 2)
20 percent to less than 80 percent, and 3) more than 80 percent. In columns 7 and 8, the ﬁrst explanatory variable indicates
ﬁrms where the loss of Jewish managers reduced the value of all three managerial characteristic by less than 20 percent.
(Including multiple heterogeneity categories in one regression, as we do in columns 7 and 8, requires deﬁning one baseline
category for losing less than 20 percent in all categories, in order to avoid a problem of perfect multicollinearity.) For ﬁrms
without Jewish managers in 1932, all of the reported indicator variables in all columns are zero. The main explanatory
variables are all interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The control variables are identical to Table
4. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm
level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 6: The Effect on Stock Prices of Firms Favored by the Nazis
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.576* -0.704**
× Post 1933 (0.333) (0.313)
Firm FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
All Controls Yes
Number of Observations 3834 3834
Number of Firms 171 171
R2 0.563 0.663
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The sample of favored ﬁrms contains ﬁrms
with connections to the Nazi Party and ﬁrms that received forced labor workers from the Nazi government. We exclude
ﬁrms historically perceived as Jewish. The control variables are identical to Table 4. The data include the months January
and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗
p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
Table 7: The Effect on Stock Prices of Firms Perceived As Jewish
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Jewish Firm -0.127 -0.137 -0.021 -0.041 0.029 0.007
× Post 1933 (0.096) (0.084) (0.097) (0.090) (0.099) (0.092)
Jewish Firm -0.140** -0.127** -0.142** -0.131**
× Post 1935 (0.057) (0.059) (0.058) (0.060)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.446*** -0.441***
× Post 1933 (0.138) (0.138)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 655 655
R2 0.563 0.619 0.563 0.620 0.567 0.623
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-
day window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The ﬁrst main explanatory variable is an indicator for ﬁrms
historically perceived as Jewish, interactedwith an indicator for themonths after January 1933. The secondmain explanatory
variable is an indicator for ﬁrms historically perceived as Jewish, interacted with an indicator for the months after January
1935. The third main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator
for the months after January 1933. The control variables are identical to Table 4. The data include the months January and
July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05,
and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 8: Correlated Demand Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
No Iron and Steel, Non-International No Firm-Speciﬁc
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) No Retail No Arms Producers Machines, Chemicals No Construction Firms Demand Shocks
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.463*** -0.464*** -0.457*** -0.449*** -0.588*** -0.425** -0.460*** -0.461*** -0.479*** -0.376** -0.449*** -0.447***
× Post 1933 (0.140) (0.140) (0.138) (0.138) (0.170) (0.187) (0.145) (0.144) (0.162) (0.165) (0.155) (0.156)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 12546 12546 12070 12070 7588 7588 12004 12004 7657 7657 10065 10065
Number of Firms 647 647 626 626 386 386 620 620 419 419 544 544
R2 0.563 0.621 0.561 0.619 0.532 0.605 0.558 0.616 0.564 0.624 0.572 0.626
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day window around January 10th and July 10th of
each year. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. We drop from the
sample: ﬁrms in the retail sector (columns 1 and 2); ﬁrms that the Reichswehr had listed as important for armaments production, based on Hansen (1978) (columns 3 and 4);
ﬁrms producing iron and steel, machines, and chemicals (columns 5 and 6); ﬁrms in the construction sector (columns 7 and 8); ﬁrms that were internationally active (columns
9 and 10); ﬁrms that were hit by ﬁrm-speciﬁc product demand shocks between 1933 and 1941 according to Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften 1941 (columns 11 and
12). The control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its 1932 ﬁnancial statement in January, ﬁrm
age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in 1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All controls are interacted with a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. The data include the months January and
July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 9: The Effect on Dividends and Returns on Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Variable: Dividends Return on Assets
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -1.266 -1.557** -0.235** -0.187**
× Post 1933 (0.960) (0.778) (0.105) (0.079)
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.528 -0.459* -0.060* -0.053*
× Post 1933 (0.326) (0.252) (0.033) (0.029)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 7379 7379 7379 7379 492 492 492 492
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 289 289 289 289
R2 0.176 0.240 0.177 0.240 0.401 0.560 0.398 0.559
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 to 4 is the annual dividend payment, measured as a percentage of the nominal
stock value. The data in columns 1 to 4 include the years 1929 to 1943. The dependent variable in columns 5 to 8 is the
return on assets, measured as the ratio of proﬁts before interest payments and taxes to total assets. The data in columns 5
to 8 include the years 1931, 1936, and 1940. The ﬁrst main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish managers in
1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The second main explanatory variable is an indicator
for whether the ﬁrm had any Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The
control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its
1932 ﬁnancial statement in January, ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in 1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All controls
are interacted with a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗
p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Figure A.1: The Effect of Losing Jewish Managers on Manager Characteristics
(With All Controls)
(a) Tenure as Manager since 1928
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(b) Experience as Manager since 1928
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(c) Managers with Degree
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(d) Connections
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(e) Connections - Same Industry
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(f) Connections - Other Industries
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Notes: The ﬁgure reports yearly coeﬃcients (βτ ) and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals from equation 1. Each panel reports
results for diﬀerent dependent variables, which are indicated in the heading of the panel. The dependent variables are in
natural logarithms. Themain explanatory variables are the fraction of Jewishmanagers in 1932, interacted with a ﬁxed eﬀect
for each year. The interaction with 1932, the last year before the Nazis gained power, is the excluded interaction. Coeﬃcients
and standard errors are scaled to reﬂect the eﬀect on the average ﬁrm with Jewish managers in 1932. The average such ﬁrm
lost 22 percent of its managers after 1932. All regressions include ﬁrm and year ﬁxed and the following control variables: an
indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its 1932 ﬁnancial statement in
January, ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in 1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All controls are interacted with a full set
of year ﬁxed eﬀects. The data include the years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level.
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Figure A.2: Stock Price Change 1933-1938
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Notes: The ﬁgure shows the average log stock price change between January 1933 (before the Nazis came to power) and
July 1938 (when virtually no Jewish managers remained in German ﬁrms). We plot the average stock price change for three
groups of ﬁrms: ﬁrms without Jewish managers in 1932; ﬁrms where the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 was positive
but below the median; and ﬁrms where the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 was above the median. The stock market
generally trended upward from 1933 to 1938. But stock prices increased by less for ﬁrms that lost a higher fraction of Jewish
managers after the Nazis came to power.
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Figure A.3: The Effect on Stock Prices, Adjusted for Dividend Payments
(a) With Firm and Year Fixed Eﬀects
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(b) With All Controls
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Notes: This ﬁgure is identical to Figure 3, except that the stock prices in the dependent variable are adjusted for dividend
payments. We adjust for dividend payments by assuming that investors immediately reinvest the dividend paid out by a
ﬁrm into the stock of that ﬁrm (see Appendix B.2.3 for details). This adjustment means that the coeﬃcients measure the
eﬀect of losing Jewish managers on the return of investing (on January 10, 1933) into the average ﬁrm with Jewish managers
in 1932, relative to investing into a ﬁrm without Jewish managers in 1932.
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Figure A.4: The Effect on Stock Prices of Firms Perceived as Jewish
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Notes: The ﬁgure reports coeﬃcients (βτ ) and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals from a regression similar to equation 3. The
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day window
around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variable is an indicator for whether the ﬁrm was
perceived as Jewish by contempories, interacted with a ﬁxed eﬀect for each time period. The interaction with January 1933,
the last period before the Nazis gained power, is the excluded interaction. The regression also controls for the fraction of
Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects, and all controls used in Figure 3, panel (b). Standard
errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level.
Figure A.5: The Share of Jews in Region-Sector Cells With Few Lower-Ranked
Jewish Employees
0.22 0.02
10.79
Blue Collar Lower−Ranked
White Collar
Managers
Notes: The ﬁgure reports the average percentage of blue collar workers (left bar), lower-ranked white color workers (middle
bar) and managers (right bar) in the sample of ﬁrms with in region-sector cells with the lowest quartiles of both blue collar
workers and lower-ranked white collar employees. This sample is equivalent to the estimatation sample for columns 5 and
6 in Table A.12. The data on lower-ranked employees come from the 1933 census (see Section B.3 for details). The data on
managers come from Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften 1932.
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Figure A.6: The Effect on Dividends
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Notes: The ﬁgure reports coeﬃcients (βτ ) and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals from a regression similar to equation 3.
The dependent variable is the annual dividend payment, measured as a percentage of the nominal stock value. The main
explanatory variables are the fraction of Jewishmanagers in 1932, interacted with a ﬁxed eﬀect for each year. The interaction
with 1932, the last year before the Nazis gained power, is the excluded interaction. The control variables include: ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects, time ﬁxed eﬀects, an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its
1932 ﬁnancial statement in January, ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in 1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All controls
are interacted with a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level.
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Table A.1: The Effect on the Characteristics of Firms’ Senior Management, us-
ing the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of Managers # of Managers # of Connections # of Connections
with Tenure with Experience # of Managers to Firms in the to Firms in
Dep. Variable: since 1928 since 1928 with Degree # of Connections Same Industry Diﬀerent Industries
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.958*** -0.662*** -0.215** -0.756*** -0.423*** -1.015***
× Post 1933 (0.115) (0.096) (0.093) (0.122) (0.082) (0.183)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 655 655
R2 0.713 0.635 0.011 0.225 0.167 0.164
Notes: The heading of each column lists the relevant dependent variable. All dependent variables are transformed using
the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, an approximation to the log transformation that permits using zero values. The
main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the years after
1932. The data include the years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance
levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.2: The Effect on the Characteristics of Firms’ Senior Management (Bi-
nary Treatment Indicator)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dep. Variable: log(# of Managers with Tenure since 1928), # of obs./ﬁrms: 2407/655
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.225*** -0.225*** -0.226*** -0.215***
× Post 1933 (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
R2 0.746 0.746 0.747 0.747 0.747 0.755
Panel B: Dep. Variable: log(# of Managers with Experience since 1928), # of obs./ﬁrms: 2487/655
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.149*** -0.163*** -0.162*** -0.161*** -0.159*** -0.150***
× Post 1933 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
R2 0.657 0.661 0.662 0.663 0.664 0.678
Panel C: Dep. Variable: log(# of Managers with Degree), # of obs./ﬁrms: 2400/645
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.144*** -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.131*** -0.123***
× Post 1933 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
R2 0.024 0.028 0.028 0.035 0.035 0.058
Panel D: Dep. Variable: log(# of Connections), # of obs./ﬁrms: 2530/655
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.233*** -0.232*** -0.233*** -0.231*** -0.234*** -0.218***
× Post 1933 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
R2 0.217 0.218 0.226 0.229 0.230 0.251
Panel E: Dep. Variable: log(# of Connections to Firms in the Same Ind.), # of obs./ﬁrms: 2530/655
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.159*** -0.158*** -0.161*** -0.159*** -0.158*** -0.138***
× Post 1933 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
R2 0.169 0.172 0.177 0.183 0.184 0.231
Panel F: Dep. Variable: log(# of Connections to Firms in Diﬀerent Ind.), # of obs./ﬁrms: 2291/640
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.276*** -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.271*** -0.275*** -0.257***
× Post 1933 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
R2 0.171 0.171 0.178 0.179 0.181 0.205
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nazi Connection × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reporting Period × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Age × Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Nominal Capital × Time FE Yes Yes
Industry FE × Time FE Yes
Notes: The heading of each panel lists the relevant dependent variable. The main explanatory variable is an indicator for
whether the ﬁrm had any Jewishmanagers in 1932, interactedwith an indicator for the years after 1932. The control variables
are identical to Table 3. The data include the years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.3: The Effect on the Total Number of Managers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable: # of Managers log(# of Managers)
Jewish Managers (1932) 0.074 0.007
× Post 1933 (0.100) (0.004)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) 0.359 -0.080
× Post 1933 (0.939) (0.056)
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) 0.089 -0.026*
× Post 1933 (0.216) (0.015)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 655 655
R2 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.359 0.358 0.358
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 to 3 is the number of managers. The dependent variable in columns 4 to 6 is the
natural logarithm of the number of managers. The ﬁrst explanatory variable measures the number of Jewish managers in
1932. The second explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932. The third explanatory variable is
an indicator for whether the ﬁrm had any Jewish managers in 1932. The three explanatory variables are all interacted with
an indicator for the years after 1932. The control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an
indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its 1932 ﬁnancial statement in January, ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in
1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. We also control for the log of the total number of managers in 1928 because there was a
secular decrease in the number of managers in ﬁrms that had large boards in 1928. All controls are interacted with a full set
of year ﬁxed eﬀects. The data include the years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.4: The Effect of Dismissals in 1933 and Dismissals After 1933 on Stock
Prices
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2)
Firms with dismissals in 1933
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.408*** -0.343**
× ✶(1933) (0.154) (0.157)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.534*** -0.490***
× Post 1934 (0.146) (0.149)
Firms with all dismissals after 1933
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.100 0.039
× ✶(1933) (0.217) (0.209)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.307 -0.440**
× Post 1934 (0.235) (0.224)
Firm FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
All Controls Yes
Number of Observations 12710 12710
Number of Firms 655 655
R2 0.567 0.622
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variables measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for (a) July 1933, (b) January 1934 and all months after, (c) July 1933 in ﬁrms
with dismissals after 1933, and (d) January 1934 and all months after in ﬁrms with dismissals after 1933. The control variables
include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its 1932 ﬁnancial
statement in January, ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in 1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All controls are interacted
with a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard
errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.5: The Effect on Stock Prices (Binary Treatment Indicator)
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.147*** -0.138*** -0.137*** -0.142*** -0.140*** -0.133***
× Post 1933 (0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nazi Connection × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reporting Period × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Age × Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Nominal Capital × Time FE Yes Yes
Industry FE × Time FE Yes
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 655 655
R2 0.566 0.568 0.570 0.579 0.581 0.621
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variable is an indicator for whether the ﬁrm
had any Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The control variables
include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its 1932 ﬁnancial
statement in January, ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in 1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All controls are interacted
with a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard
errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
Table A.6: The Effect on Stock Prices of Firms With At Least One Jewish Man-
ager
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4)
At Least One Jewish Without
Manager Conglomerates
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.298 -0.370* -0.297 -0.394**
× Post 1933 (0.195) (0.188) (0.196) (0.187)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes
Number of Observations 8648 8648 8593 8593
Number of Firms 408 408 406 406
R2 0.565 0.626 0.566 0.630
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The sample contains all ﬁrms with at least one Jewish manager.
In addition, we drop conglomerates in columns 3 and 4. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The control variables include: an indicator
for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its 1932 ﬁnancial statement in January,
ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in 1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All controls are interacted with a full set of time
ﬁxed eﬀects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at
the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.7: The Effect on Stock Prices Controlling for Firm Size
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Without Firm Size
Full Sample Conglomerates ≤ Median > Median
Panel A: Measure of Firm Size: Nominal Capital
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.464*** -0.416*** -0.403*** -0.441*** -0.637** -0.468***
× Post 1933 (0.138) (0.136) (0.134) (0.134) (0.268) (0.159)
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12655 5170 7540
Number of Firms 655 655 655 653 335 320
R2 0.622 0.628 0.635 0.626 0.660 0.630
Panel B: Measure of Firm Size: Total Number of Managers
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.416*** -0.381*** -0.368*** -0.401*** -0.493** -0.433**
× Post 1933 (0.135) (0.136) (0.137) (0.136) (0.215) (0.169)
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12655 5950 6760
Number of Firms 655 655 655 653 345 310
R2 0.624 0.624 0.634 0.625 0.657 0.623
Panel C: Measure of Firm Size: Both Nominal Capital and Total Number of Managers
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.418*** -0.380*** -0.358*** -0.404***
× Post 1933 (0.135) (0.135) (0.132) (0.135)
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12655
Number of Firms 655 655 655 653
R2 0.625 0.629 0.647 0.627
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Size Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log of Firm Size Yes
Deciles of Firm Size Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. We use the full sample in columns 1 to
3. In column 4, we drop conglomerates. In column 5, the sample contains only ﬁrms below the median for the respective
ﬁrm size measure (panel A: nominal capital, panel B: total number of managers). In column 6, the sample contains only
ﬁrms above the median for the respective ﬁrm size measure. Column 1 and columns 4 to 7 control for the level of nominal
capital, column 2 for natural logarithm of nominal capital, and column 3 for deciles of nominal capital. All speciﬁcations
control for: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its 1932 ﬁnancial
statement in January, ﬁrm age in 1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All controls, including the controls for nominal capital,
are interacted with a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to
1943. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.8: The Effect on Stock Prices Using Alternative Stock Price Measures
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exclude 1932 5-day Window 3-day Window Monthly Stock Prices
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.530*** -0.512*** -0.484*** -0.468*** -0.489*** -0.468*** -0.456*** -0.445***
× Post 1933 (0.148) (0.149) (0.141) (0.139) (0.144) (0.142) (0.137) (0.137)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 11841 11841 11781 11781 11330 11330 12762 12762
Number of Firms 655 655 653 653 653 653 654 654
R2 0.502 0.565 0.554 0.612 0.545 0.605 0.571 0.626
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window (columns 1 and 2), plus-minus ﬁve-day window (columns 3 and 4), or plus-minus three-day window (columns 5
and 6) around January 10th and July 10th of each year. Stock prices in columns 7 and 8 are averaged over the entire month
of January and July of each year. We exclude the observations for 1932 in columns 1 and 2. The main explanatory variable
measures the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The
control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its
1932 ﬁnancial statement in January, ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in 1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All controls
are interacted with a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to
1943. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
Table A.9: The Effect on Stock Prices of Regularly Traded Firms
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
≥ 15 stock prices ≥ 25 stock prices 30 stock prices
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.421*** -0.445*** -0.396** -0.421*** -0.700*** -0.725***
× Post 1933 (0.146) (0.145) (0.157) (0.154) (0.235) (0.233)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 10645 10645 8755 8755 3690 3690
Number of Firms 401 401 306 306 123 123
R2 0.574 0.639 0.597 0.667 0.570 0.677
Notes: We include ﬁrms that were traded on at least 15 Januarys or Julys between January 1929 and July 1943 in columns
1 and 2. We include ﬁrms that were traded on at least 25 Januarys or Julys in columns 3 and 4. We include ﬁrms that
were traded on all 30 Januarys or Julys in columns 5 and 6. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock
price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main
explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after
January 1933. The control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether
the ﬁrm published its 1932 ﬁnancial statement in January, ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in 1932, and industry ﬁxed
eﬀects. All controls are interacted with a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. The data include the months January and July for the
years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗
p<0.1.
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Table A.10: The Effect on Firm Delisting
Dep. Variable: Delisting Indicator (1) (2) (3) (4)
Linear Probability Model Extended Cox Hazard Model
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.018 -0.038
(0.128) (0.130)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.415 -0.315
× Post 1933 (0.448) (0.457)
All Controls Yes Yes
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655
R2 0.000 0.051
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the results of a cross-sectional, linear probability model. The dependent variable in columns
1 and 2 is an indicator that is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm was delisted after January 1933. The main explanatory variable measures
the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932. The control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party,
an indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its 1932 ﬁnancial statement in January, ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital
in 1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Columns 3 and 4 report the results of an extended Cox hazard model, with time-varying
coeﬃcients. The data include two periods, before and after January 1933. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the
natural logarithm of the relative hazard of being delisted in the relevant period. The main explanatory variable measures
the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the period after January 1933. The control variables
are as in columns 1 and 2, but all are interacted with ﬁxed eﬀects for the periods before and after January 1933. Standard
errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.11: The Effect of Losing Managers in Important and Regular Positions
on Stock Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price)
Frac. Jewish Managers in Important -0.252* -0.262* -0.261* -0.289** -0.287** -0.267**
Positions (1932) × Post 1933 (0.137) (0.135) (0.135) (0.131) (0.131) (0.128)
Frac. Jewish Managers in Regular -0.212 -0.196 -0.195 -0.196 -0.196 -0.206
Positions (1932) × Post 1933 (0.130) (0.128) (0.128) (0.127) (0.127) (0.128)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nazi Connection × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reporting Period × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Age × Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Nominal Capital × Time FE Yes Yes
Industry FE × Time FE Yes
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 655 655
R2 0.566 0.569 0.570 0.580 0.582 0.622
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The ﬁrst main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in important positions in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. Important positions
are deﬁned as executive board positions or chair and vice chair of the supervisory board. The second main explanatory vari-
able measures the fraction of Jewish managers in regular supervisory board positions in 1932, interacted with an indicator
for the months after January 1933. The control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an
indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its 1932 ﬁnancial statement in January, ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in
1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All controls are interacted with a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. The data include the months
January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗
p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.12: The Effect on Stock Prices in Region-Sector Cells With Few Lower-
Ranked Jewish Employees
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Below 25th Percentile of Jewish Employees Among:
Blue Collar Lower-Ranked White
Workers Collar Employees Both Categories
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.776** -0.689* -0.750** -0.758** -0.857** -0.860**
× Post 1933 (0.338) (0.370) (0.329) (0.365) (0.367) (0.416)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2824 2824 2888 2888 2342 2342
Number of Firms 165 165 165 165 136 136
R2 0.569 0.662 0.588 0.667 0.578 0.666
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. In columns 1 and 2, we only include ﬁrms
in regions-sector cells below the 25th percentile among blue collar workers. In columns 3 and 4, we only include ﬁrms in
regions-sector cells below the 25th percentile among lower-ranked white collar employees. In columns 5 and 6, we only
include ﬁrms in regions-sector cells below the 25th percentile among both blue collar workers and lower-ranked white collar
employees. The data for the lower-ranked employees are from the 1933 German census. The additional control variables
include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its 1932 ﬁnancial
statement in January, ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in 1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All controls are interacted
with a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard
errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.13: The Effect on Stock Prices of Firms Without Large Jewish Share-
holders
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.480*** -0.489***
× Post 1933 (0.156) (0.157)
Firm FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
All Controls Yes
Number of Observations 11329 11329
Number of Firms 589 589
R2 0.560 0.621
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. We drop ﬁrms from the sample where
a Jewish individual or a Jewish ﬁrm (for example a Jewish private bank) was a large shareholders. The control variables
include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the ﬁrm published its 1932 ﬁnancial
statement in January, ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in 1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All controls are interacted
with a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard
errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.14: The Effect on Stock Prices, Testing for Spillover Effects
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.461*** -0.461*** -0.432*** -0.430*** -0.423*** -0.408***
× Post 1933 (0.140) (0.135) (0.144) (0.142) (0.150) (0.145)
Avg. Frac. Jewish Managers (Industry) -0.151 -0.395 -0.166 -0.416
× Post 1933 (0.480) (0.452) (0.491) (0.459)
Avg. Frac. Jewish Managers (Region) -0.269 -0.370 -0.275 -0.385
× Post 1933 (0.360) (0.349) (0.368) (0.355)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 655 655
R2 0.566 0.582 0.566 0.582 0.566 0.583
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day window around January 10th and July 10th of each
year. The ﬁrst main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 at ﬁrm i. The second main explanatory variable measures the (weighted) average
fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 in all other ﬁrms in the same industry. The third main explanatory variable measures the (weighted) average fraction of Jewish managers
in 1932 in all other ﬁrms in the same region. The three main explanatory variables are interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. We weight ﬁrms by
nominal capital to calculate the average fraction of Jewish managers in all other ﬁrms in the same industry or region. For this weighting, we winsorize nominal capital at the
99.5th percentile, to ensure the three largest ﬁrms do not bias the average values excessively. The results are similar when we include unweighted measures of the average
fraction of Jewish managers in the same industry or region in the regressions. The control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator
for whether the ﬁrm published its 1932 ﬁnancial statement in January, ﬁrm age in 1932, ﬁrm nominal capital in 1932, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All controls are interacted with
a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels:
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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B Online Data Appendix
B.1 Information on Managers
The data on senior managers of all ﬁrms listed on the Berlin Stock exchange in 1932 come from
four editions of the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (1928, 1932, 1933, and 1939),which
is a compilation of annual reports of all joint stock ﬁrms in Germany (see Figure B.1 for a sample
page). Until 1933, the Handbuch included amendments, so that the list of senior managers reﬂects
the status at the end of the respective years (1928, 1932, and 1933). In 1939, the Handbuch did
not publish amendments so that the list of senior managers reﬂects the status at the time of the
publication of the annual report. We therefore refer to the relevant years as 1928, 1932, 1933, and
1938.
Figure B.1: Example Page from Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften 1932
Notes: The ﬁgure displays the entry for Bayerische Motoren-Werke (BMW) from the 1932 edition of the Handbuch der
deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, pp 435-437.
B.1.1 Harmonizing Manager Names
We manually harmonize the spelling of thousands of manager names. This allows us to match
managers across ﬁrms in the same volume of the Handbuch and/or across diﬀerent volumes of the
Handbuch. For example “Philipp Heineken” is sometimes abbreviated as “Phil. Heineken” or “Ph.
Heineken.” The harmonization also allows us to match managers to sources on Jewish managers.
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B.1.2 Measuring Manager Characteristics
Tenure and Experience
After harmonizing the spelling of manager names, we merge the list of all managers who were
present 1932 to the list of managers who were present in 1928. This allows us to measure tenure
and experience as senior managers since 1928.
University Degree
We classify managers as managers with a degree if the Handbuch lists them with the following
characteristics:
1. Professor title (Prof.)
2. PhD (Dr.)
3. Professions that require a university degree (for example Diplomingeneur, Rechtsanwalt,
Architekt, Chemiker)
4. Civil service positions that require a university degree (for example Justizrat, Ministerialdirek-
tor, Finanzrat)
Sometimes, the same manager reports a characteristic (for example a PhD degree) in the annual
report of one ﬁrm but does not report the characteristic in the annual report of another ﬁrm. If
a characteristic is reported at least once for a manager in a certain volume of the Handbuch we
classify the manager as holding that characteristic (for example a university degree) for all ﬁrms
in that year.
Number of Supervisory Board Positions in Other Firms
For each of the four years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938 we count the number of supervisory board po-
sitions in other ﬁrms of our Berlin sample using the manager name (after harmonizing the spelling
of manager names) and additional information about the manager (for example whether he holds
a PhD degree or information on his place of residence).
B.1.3 Information on the Jewish Origin of Managers
As described in the main text, we consult multiple sources to identify Jewish managers.
1. Münzel (2006)
Münzel (2006) analyses Jewish board members in the 300 largest joint stock ﬁrms. We extract
all Jewish board members from his book.
2. Windolf (2011)
Windolf (2011) compiles a list of Jewish board members in German ﬁrms. We use this list to
identify additional Jewish board members.
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3. Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933
The Biographisches Handbuch contains short biographies of Jewish business people who em-
igrated from Nazi Germany. We extract all individuals who are listed under the business
heading.
4. Köhler (2008)
Studies private bankers of Jewish origin. We extract all Jewish private bankers from his book.
5. World Biographical Information System (WBIS)
The database combines biographical information from various collections of biographies, for
example Deutsches Biographisches Archiv (DBA) and Jüdisches Biographisches Archiv (JBA).
We search the WBIS for all managers who did not appear in sources 1 to 4 to check whether
they were of Jewish origin. Jews are identiﬁed if they appear in the Jüdisches Biographisches
Archiv (JBA), Ekkehard (1929), Lowenthal (1981), Tetzlaﬀ (1982), Walk (2014), or if they list
their religion as Jewish in any other source. The following example provides an overview of
the procedure.
Example World Biographical Information System (WBIS)
The 1932 edition of the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften lists Alfred Zielenziger
as manager of Deutsche Hypothekenbank AG and Schultheiss-Patzenhofer Brauerei AG. Since
Zielenziger is not listed among the managers in sources 1 to 4 we follow a manual search
through World Biographical Information System (WBIS). We ﬁnd three entries in Deutsches
Biographisches Archiv (DBA) and two entries in Jüdisches Biographisches Archiv (JBA). Figure
B.2 reports the respective entries from the DBA. The entries from JBA are identical to entries
(b) and (c) from DBA and therefore not reported. We identify Alfred Zielenziger as Jewish
because he appears in Lowenthal (1981) and Walk (2014), which are biographical sources on
Jews in Germany.
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Figure B.2: Example of Alfred Zielenziger
(a) Wenzel (1929) (b) Lowenthal (1981) (c) Walk (2014)
Notes: The ﬁgure displays the entries for Alfred Zielenziger from World Biographical Informa-
tion System (WBIS) based on Wenzel (1929), Lowenthal (1981), and Walk (2014).
6. Internet Search
Finally, we hand-check all managers who do not appear in sources 1 to 5 by conducting an
internet search to ﬁnd information on their religion. For example, for managers based in
Berlin, we look up Jüdisches Addressbuch für Großberlin, 1931 (available at: https://digital.
zlb.de/viewer/resolver?urn=urn:nbn:de:kobv:109-1-2414417) and verify whether they can be
matched by name and address with an entry in the address book. The following example
provides an overview of the procedure.
Example Internet Search
The 1932 edition of theHandbuch der deutschenAktiengesellschaften lists Dr. FelixWarschauer
as manager of Hermann Meyer & Co. AG. Since Dr. Warschauer is not listed among the
managers in sources 1 to 4 we follow a manual search through WBIS. We ﬁnd one entry
in Deutsches Biographisches Archiv (DBA). The entry in Wenzel (1929) lists Dr. Warschauer
with an address in Berlin (Berlin-Schöneberg, Bayerischer Platz 9, see Figure B.3), but does
not contain information on his religion. The Berlin address allows us to check for an entry
in the Jüdisches Addressbuch für Großberlin, 1931 which lists addresses of Jews in Berlin. We
ﬁnd Dr. Felix Warschauer with the same address in the Jüdisches Addressbuch für Großberlin,
1931 (see Figure B.3) and hence classify him as a Jew.
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Figure B.3: Example of Dr. Felix Warschauer
(a) Wenzel (1929)
(b) Jüdisches Adressbuch für
Großberlin, 1931
Notes: The left subﬁgure displays the entries for Dr. Felix Warschauer fromWorld Biographical
Information System (WBIS) based on Wenzel (1929). The right subﬁgure displays the entry for
Dr. Felix Warschauer from Jüdisches Adressbuch für Großberlin, 1931, p. 420.
B.2 Information on Firms
B.2.1 Stock Price Data
We manually digitize all stock prices for January and July of each year between 1929 and 1943
from historical listings (called Börse und Wirtschaft, later Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse) of the
Berlin Stock Exchange. Figure B.4 provides an example of page 21 from the January 1933 edition.
Because of the German banking crisis in 1931/1932 the Berlin Stock Exchangewas closed in January
1932. We therefore collect stock prices for April and October for 1932.
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Figure B.4: Example Page from Börse und Wirtschaft, later Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse
. . .
Notes: The ﬁgure displays the top left and top right of page 21 of the January 1933 edition of Börse und Wirtschaft,
later Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse. The columns of the left panel report (from left to right) the dividend in 30/31, the
dividend in 31/32, the reporting period, the stock name, and the stock prices of the trading days indicated as column
titles. The columns of the top left panel (from left to right) report additional stock prices and the lowest (niedrigst) and
highest (höchst) stock price and the respective dates in the calender year 1933.
NameChanges: We track stocks even if they change names (for exampleKrauß&Comp. changed
its name to Lokomot. Krauß in July 1934). In most cases, the reported highest and lowest stock
prices over the calendar year reveal that the stocks changed names. For example, in July 1934
Lokomot. Krauß reported a lowest stock price over the calendar year of 67 for January 19, 1934,
which exactly matches the stock price of Krauß & Comp. on that day. In addition, we verify all
name changes by consulting the narrative information in the Handbuch der deutschen Aktienge-
sellschaften.
Stock Consolidations: Between 1929 and 1943, the stocks of some ﬁrms were consolidated. For
example, Dresdner Bank stocks were consolidated on August 4, 1932 at an old-stock:new-stock
ratio of 10:3. As a result, the reported stock price increased by 333 percent. We account for these
consolidations by dividing all stock prices by the consolidation ratio (3.333 in our example) after
each consolidation.
The exact dates of stock consolidations are indicated in the monthly publications of Börse und
Wirtschaft, laterMonatskursblatt Berliner Börse. To obtain consolidation ratios we exploit informa-
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tion on adjustments to the highest and lowest stock prices that are reported in Börse undWirtschaft,
laterMonatskursblatt Berliner Börse.44 After a consolidation, the highest and lowest stock prices are
adjusted to reﬂect the consolidation. This allows us to calculate exact consolidation ratios. For ex-
ample the highest and lowest stock price forDresdner Bankwere reported as 181
2
and 24 in July 1932
but the reporting changed to 612
3
and 80 in August 1932 (Dresdner Bank stocks were consolidated
on August 4, 1932).
In exceptional cases, the highest and lowest stock price changes in the same month as the
consolidation. In those cases, we use the change in the stock price on the date of the consolidation
to infer the consolidation ratio. For example, Brown Boveri stocks were consolidated on January
4, 1935. As the consolidation happened early in the year, highest and lowest stock prices were
reported only after the consolidation andwe can therefore not observe adjustments in the reporting
of highest and lowest stock prices. We therefore use the ratio of stock prices on the last trading day
before the consolidation (January 3, 1935, stock price:143
4
) and the stock price on the day of the
consolidation (January 4, 1935, stock price: 74). The consolidation ratio is therefore 5.02 (74/14.75)
in this example.
Deduction of Subscription Rights: Between 1929 and 1943 some ﬁrms issued new stocks and
oﬀered existing shareholders a subscription right to prevent stock dilution. Starting from the
day this subscription right is executed, the monthly publications of Börse und Wirtschaft, later
Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse report stock prices excluding the subscription right. For example,
Deutscher Eisenhandel AG issued new stocks in 1936 and oﬀered existing shareholders a subscrip-
tion right. The subscription right is valued 6.5 percent and deducted starting from August 10, 1936.
As a consequence, the stock price drops mechanically from 138.50 on August 8, 1936 to 132 on
August 10, 1936. We adjust for these deductions by multiplying all subsequent stock prices by an
adjustment factor, deﬁned as the ratio of the old price with subscription right divided by the old
price minus the subscription right.45 In the case ofDeutscher Eisenhandel AG this adjustment factor
is given by 1.049 ( 138.50
138.50−6.50
).
B.2.2 Dividend Data
The historical listings (called Börse undWirtschaft, laterMonatskursblatt Berliner Börse) of the Berlin
Stock Exchange report dividend payments for the sample ﬁrms (see Figure B.4 for an example). As
stocks that get delisted early in the year do not report the latest dividend payment, we augment
the data from the Berlin exchange with information on dividend payments from the Handbuch der
deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (1935 and 1941).
44Highest and lowest stock prices are reported for the calendar year.
45This adjustment is standard practice in the construction of long-run stock indices. It assumes that the value of the
subscription right is re-invested into the same stock to prevent stock dilution (Ronge 2002, p. 58).
72
Dividends are generally reported in percent of nominal capital. Insurance ﬁrms, however, re-
port dividends in Reichsmark (RM) per stock. To obtain a consistent database we convert the latter
into percent of nominal capital.
B.2.3 Stock Price Adjustments for Dividend Payments
For Appendix Figure A.3, we compute stock prices by taking into account that investors receive
annual dividend payments in addition to capital gains. We collect dividends and their payment
dates from Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse and augment dividend payments with data from Hand-
buch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften 1925 and 1941. To compute stock prices that reﬂect total
returns, we adjust stock prices for price changes that are entirely due to dividend payments (fol-
lowing standard practice as outlined in Ronge 2002). After a dividend payment, we multiply the
stock price by an adjustment factor, which is deﬁned as the ratio of the pre-payment price divided
by the pre-payment price minus the dividend. We use the last observed price in our dataset prior to
the dividend payment as the pre-payment price. In some cases, the exact dividend payment date is
missing in theMonatskursblatt Berliner Börse. As the average ﬁrm in our sample pays the dividend
between May and June (but closer to June 1), we use June 1 as the pre-payment price for dividend
payments with missing dates.
B.2.4 Return on Assets
We digitize data on proﬁts and assets from the 1932 and 1941 editions of theHandbuch der deutschen
Aktiengesellschaften. The 1932 edition of the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften reports
the income statements and balance sheets for the year 1931, while the 1941 edition reports the
years 1936 and 1940. The return on assets is the ratio of proﬁts before interest payments and
taxes (calculated from the income statement) to total assets (from the balance sheet). To calculate
proﬁts before interest payments and taxes, we use the book value of proﬁts and subtract the proﬁt
carryforward from the previous year, subtract the net income from the sale of own stocks, subtract
the net income from payments out of reserve funds, add depreciation, add taxes, and add interest
payments.
Many of the 655 ﬁrms in our estimation sample do not report the income statement and balance
sheet items that are required for the calculation of the return on assets. As a result, the data allow
us to calculate the return on assets for 289 ﬁrms in at least one year (1931, 1936, or 1940). Two ﬁrms
do not report values in 1936 or 1940, so we use the 1937 and 1939 values, respectively. Dropping
these observations from the sample does not aﬀect the results.
B.2.5 Firm Age, Nominal Capital, Reporting Period, Industry
We collect data on ﬁrm age, nominal capital and the industry of the ﬁrm from Handbuch der
deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (1932). We collect data on the period during which the balance sheet
is reported from Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse.
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B.2.6 Information on Jewish Firms
We consult historic sources that identify Jewish ﬁrms (Bruer 1927; Landsberg 1927a,b; Priester 1927;
Mosse 1987). We extract all ﬁrms that are listed as Jewish in at least one of the sources. Figure B.5
provides an example from Landsberg (1927b). The author describes the historical development
of the textile industry and lists Jewish ﬁrms in various sub-industries, for example, the furniture
and carpet industry. In the excerpt, Landsberg lists among other ﬁrms G. Feibisch and Nordeutsche
Trikotweberei AG, which are listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange.
Figure B.5: Example from Landsberg (1927b)
„Mischung" zu verzeichnen.
Als sonst bekannte Firmen seien noch genannt M. & O. Sommerfeld in
Cottbus, in der Vigogneindustrie Marschel Frank Sachs Akt-Ges.
in Chemnitz und mehrere zum Blumenstein-Konzern direkt oder indirekt ge¬
hörende Firmen, besonders die Vereinigten Vigognespinnereien-Akt-Ges. Von
den anderen Zweigen der Wollweberei verzeichnen die Wolldeckenbranche
sowie die Möbelstoff- und Teppichindustrie mehrere jüdische Firmen, bei¬
spielsweise die Rheinische Möbelstoffweberei-Akt-Ges. und Teppichfabrik
Akt-Ges. in Beuel (durch Verwaltungsmajorität), die Teppichfirmen
G. Feibisch, G F. Schwendy, die Möbelstoffweberei Goeritz einschließlich Nord¬
deutsche Trikotweberei vorm. Sprick, Akt-Ges., die Smyrna Teppichfabriken-
Akt-Ges.
In der Baumwollbranche befindet sich der Rohstoffhandel mit
Notes: The ﬁgure displays an excerpt from page 108 of Landsberg (1927b).
B.2.7 Identifying Jewish Shareholders
We collect information on all large shareholders of the 655 ﬁrms listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange
from the 1932 edition of theHandbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften. Wematch the list of these
large shareholders with our lists of Jewishmanagers and Jewish ﬁrms. For shareholders that are not
listed in these sources we conduct an internet search to ﬁnd further information on the respective
individual or ﬁrm. The following example provides an overview of the procedure.
Example Internet Search
One example of a ﬁrm listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange is Baroper Walzwerk AG. The ﬁrm
reports Wolf Netter & Jacobi-Werke KGaA as one of its large shareholders. We ﬁrst check whether
Wolf Netter & Jacobi-Werke KGaA appears in sources about Jewish ﬁrms (see Section B.2.6). After
not ﬁnding it in these sources, we conduct an internet search forWolf Netter & Jacobi-Werke KGaA.
We ﬁnd Wolf Netter & Jacobi-Werke KGaA in the database Jewish Businesses in Berlin 1930-1945
(available at: https://www2.hu-berlin.de/djgb/www/ﬁnd?language=en_US), which is based on the
research of Kreutzmüller (2017). This allows us to classify Wolf Netter & Jacobi-Werke KGaA as a
large Jewish shareholder of Baroper Walzwerk AG.
B.3 Further Details on Measures of Lower-Level Jewish Employees
We collect measures of lower-level Jewish employees from publications of the German statistical
agency (Statistik des Deutschen Reichs) that are based on the German census of 1933. The publica-
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tions report the number of Jews by occupational level (for example workers, blue collar workers
and white collar workers), sector (manufacturing or services), and region (for example East Prussia
without Königsberg) or large city (for example Berlin, Hamburg, Breslau, or Königsberg). When-
ever we are able to use the city-level information, we do so (for about 33 percent of the sample).
Otherwise, we use the regional information. We also obtain similar information for all German
workers and then calculate the share of Jews among blue collar workers (category “l” in the census
data) and lower-level white collar workers (category “a” in the census data).
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